What deals did Chevron strike with Venezuela after 2007 and what financial terms, if any, have been publicly disclosed?

Checked on January 3, 2026
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Executive summary

Chevron maintained a commercial presence in Venezuela after the 2007 nationalization by accepting restructured, PDVSA‑controlled joint ventures and operating minority stakes in several projects (Chevron’s own account; Euronews) [1] [2]. Public reporting shows the basic architecture of later deals — U.S. Treasury licenses permitting limited operations, a Biden‑era arrangement that let Chevron resume exports (with contested accounts about cash payments), and a subsequent Trump‑era rewrite that moved payments toward in‑kind oil deliveries — but concrete, line‑by‑line financial terms (percentages, prices, contract texts) remain largely undisclosed in the public record [3] [4] [5] [6].

1. Chevron’s post‑2007 footing: minority stakes inside PDVSA joint ventures

After the 2006–07 reshuffle that forced foreign firms to cede majority control to PDVSA, Chevron accepted renegotiated terms and stayed as a minority partner in Orinoco Belt and other projects — an approach explicitly contrasted in reporting with Exxon and ConocoPhillips, which exited and pursued arbitration — and Chevron’s corporate site lists partnerships in five onshore and offshore projects and cites roughly $100 million invested locally since 2006 [2] [7] [1].

2. U.S. sanctions, Treasury licenses and the Biden‑era reopening narrative

The U.S. sanctions regime after 2019 restricted PDVSA dealings, but successive Treasury waivers and licenses allowed Chevron to resume limited pumping and exports; Fortune reports a Biden‑era accommodation that effectively let Chevron pay “hundreds of millions” to Venezuelan entities despite general‑license prohibitions on paying royalties or taxes in cash, a move framed by some officials as transactional diplomacy tied to political concessions from Maduro [3].

3. Reported cash flows and the limits of public accounting

News outlets have quantified some flows: reporting cites that under the prior (Biden‑era) arrangement Chevron funneled roughly $2.4 billion into the Venezuelan economy in one recent year, a figure framed as material to Venezuela’s legal hard‑currency supply [4]. Chevron’s own disclosures emphasize operational investments (the $100 million since 2006 figure and $7 million in humanitarian contributions since 2019), but do not publish detailed contract terms for joint ventures or export sales [1] [4].

4. Trump‑era license rewrites: from cash to in‑kind oil deliveries

Multiple investigations and reports say the Trump administration halted the prior license and then reissued a revised license that, according to U.S. and Venezuelan officials and PDVSA data, required Chevron not to remit royalties or taxes as cash via banks but instead to transfer part of production in‑kind to PDVSA — effectively delivering barrels rather than dollars — and internal PDVSA records suggest those in‑kind barrels were exported by intermediaries that profited handsomely (New York Times; WLRN; Financial Post) [4] [5] [6].

5. What has been publicly disclosed and what remains hidden

Publicly disclosed items are limited and piecemeal: Chevron’s corporate investment figures ($100 million since 2006; $7 million humanitarian) are disclosed on its site, press and investigative reporting cite aggregate flows (about $2.4 billion in a cited year) and describe the shift to in‑kind payments, and business outlets report that Chevron agreed to hand over a percentage of output under the new license — but the precise percentages, pricing formulas, commercial contracts, and the full text of U.S. Treasury licenses have not been published in the sources provided, leaving important commercial and legal details opaque [1] [4] [6] [3].

6. Competing narratives and implicit agendas in the coverage

Coverage diverges by outlet and by political lens: some reporting frames Chevron’s operations as stabilizing Venezuelan production and U.S. energy security (DW, Chevron statements), while investigative pieces highlight the risk of empowering Maduro‑aligned intermediaries and question transparency around who monetized PDVSA’s share of crude [8] [4] [5]. Corporate statements emphasize compliance and modest short‑term profit impact, advocacy and watchdog reporting emphasize the political leverage and potential for sanctioned actors to benefit — both perspectives draw on overlapping facts but stress different risks and benefits [9] [4] [5].

7. Bottom line for readers seeking verifiable financial terms

The available public record documents the broad deal structure — minority joint‑venture operations, U.S. licenses permitting exports, aggregate cash flows reported by journalists, and a shift to in‑kind oil deliveries under a later license — but does not make available the granular contract terms (exact royalty rates, percentage shares, price formulas, or the full licensing text) needed to state definitive, line‑item financial terms; inquiries to Chevron, PDVSA or the U.S. Treasury and access to the underlying contracts would be required to fill those gaps [1] [3] [4] [6].

Want to dive deeper?
What specific U.S. Treasury (OFAC) licenses were issued to Chevron for Venezuela, and are their texts publicly available?
How much crude (barrels) has Chevron produced/exported from Venezuelan joint ventures each year since 2022, according to PDVSA and shipping data?
Which intermediaries handled PDVSA’s in‑kind oil sales since Chevron resumed operations, and what public evidence links them to sanctioned figures?