Which countries or refiners have increased silver refining capacity since China's 2026 export licensing changes?
Executive summary
China moved to a license-based export regime for silver effective January 1, 2026, and published a whitelist of 44 firms authorised to export through 2026–27 [1] [2]. Reporting documents one clear outside beneficiary — South Korea’s refiners, led by Korea Zinc’s Onsan refinery, which have been singled out as increasing their role in global supply chains — but independent, verifiable evidence of broad, concrete capacity expansions in other countries is thin in the available reporting [3] [4].
1. Korea: the most‑documented ramp-up in refining prominence
South Korean refiners are repeatedly identified as the immediate industrial link stepping into gaps created by Chinese licensing; Korea Zinc’s Onsan refinery is explicitly named as a pivotal facility that has emerged as a crucial alternative for downstream users outside China [3]. Multiple outlets frame Korea not simply as a buyer but as a refining hub that has expanded its strategic importance to U.S. and other supply chains after China tightened export rules [3]. That reporting portrays Korea’s refiners as having increased throughput or tightened commercial ties to replace some flows that previously moved through Chinese refiners, though exact tonnage or formal capacity‑expansion announcements are not provided in the cited articles [3].
2. China’s whitelist reshapes flows; most reporting emphasizes risk, not confirmed greenfield builds
China’s move to a controlled, two‑year exporter list of 44 firms and a licensing mechanism replaces the prior quota system and is presented as creating chokepoints that incentivise sourcing outside China [5] [6] [4]. Much analyst commentary and industry coverage focuses on the likely consequences—price volatility, diversification strategies, and investment rhetoric—rather than documenting finished refinery expansions overseas [7] [8]. Several trade and investment pieces claim China controls roughly 60–70% of global silver refining capacity, underpinning why buyers are urgently watching for alternatives [9] [3].
3. Signs of response — investment talk, technology transfer, and strategic stockpiling, but limited proof of new capacity yet
A number of industry analyses and trade outlets describe plans or incentives for technology transfer and investment to disperse refining capability beyond China, and argue consuming nations and companies are exploring domestic refining projects and strategic stockpiles to reduce dependency [6] [10]. These narratives fit a classic diversification playbook, but the sources present them as expectations or opportunities rather than documenting concrete, completed capacity increases in specific countries beyond Korea [6] [10]. Reporting of firms turning away ultra‑pure material because of Chinese bottlenecks signals capacity stress, not proven expansion elsewhere [11].
4. What the reporting does not show — gaps, uncertainties and potential agendas
The available sources do not supply a definitive, global list of refiners or countries that have formally increased installed silver refining capacity since the licensing changes; most are descriptive, predictive or focused on China’s whitelist and market impacts [5] [4]. Several commercial/analysis sites carry alarmist language about “seismic shifts” and market scarcity that reflect a pro‑diversification or investor agenda [12] [10], while industry press highlights short‑term winners like Korean refiners [3]. Where sources claim numerical shares (60–70% of refining capacity) they trace back to market estimates rather than newly reported capacity builds outside China [9] [3].
5. Bottom line: one documented shift; broader capacity increases remain unproven in open reporting
On the evidence in the provided reporting, South Korean refiners — notably Korea Zinc at Onsan — are the most clearly documented refiners to have increased prominence and activity since China’s 2026 export licensing changes [3]. Beyond Korea, the literature documents strong intent, investment talk, and strategic repositioning by buyers and governments, but does not substantiate widespread, completed increases in silver refining capacity in other countries; independent confirmation of greenfield expansions or capacity‑upgrade completions is absent from these sources [6] [10] [11].