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What is the current state of Russia's oil refining capacity?
Executive Summary
Russia currently retains one of the world’s largest installed oil‑refining systems—historically around 6.8 million barrels per day of capacity—yet actual throughput and operability have diverged sharply from installed figures because of maintenance, sanctions effects, security incidents and operational outages reported through 2024–2025 [1] [2] [3]. Recent reporting documents a mix of rising idle or offline capacity and bouts of recovery: analyses from late 2024 and 2025 describe both a substantial increase in idle capacity projected for 2024 and an August 2025 spike in offline refining caused by drone attacks and planned maintenance, underscoring that installed capacity and real‑time refining runs tell different stories [4] [3] [5].
1. Big Picture: Russia’s Installed Capacity Versus What Runs the Refineries
Russia’s oil refining system ranks among the world’s largest by installed nameplate capacity, with Statista placing capacity at about 6.8 million barrels per day in 2022, a long‑term expansion since 2000 that underpins global refinery balances [1]. Installed capacity, however, is a theoretical ceiling and does not equate to continual throughput, and multiple sources in 2024–2025 indicate substantial divergence between capacity and actual processing. Analysts and industry trackers emphasize that scheduled maintenance, equipment failures, sanctions pressure on key operators, and targeted security incidents reduce runs; therefore the headline capacity number overstates the volume Russia can reliably refine at any given moment [1] [2] [3].
2. Evidence of Rising Idle Capacity and Planned Adjustments in 2024
Industry summaries and market analysts signaled a significant increase in idle refining capacity through 2024, with one analysis projecting a 108% rise in idle capacity to around 40,696 thousand tonnes—a sign of strategic adjustments, maintenance cycles, or constrained operations that could reshape product flows and export patterns [4]. Higher idle capacity can reflect routine turnarounds but also longer‑lasting constraints: if refineries remain offline longer than planned, domestic fuel availability and export mix shift, pushing more crude to export markets or forcing deeper price discounts. The 2024 signals therefore indicate not a collapse of capacity but a structural tightening of available throughput and flexibility [4].
3. Security Shocks and Maintenance: The 2024–2025 Output Story
Operational disruptions from non‑economic causes have meaningfully reduced actual refining runs. Multiple accounts note that drone attacks and technical outages in 2024–2025 idled significant refinery volumes, with Reuters reporting an August 2025 record level of offline primary refining capacity—about 6.4 million tonnes offline in that month, roughly 17% of total capacity—much of which stemmed from Ukrainian drone strikes and scheduled maintenance [3]. These security shocks produce short‑term regional gasoline shortages and force working refineries to lift runs where possible, but they also expose the system’s vulnerability: even with high installed capacity, concentrated damage to key plants can generate outsized market impacts and policy responses such as export curbs [3] [5].
4. Sanctions, Corporate Exposure, and Trade Channels That Matter
US sanctions targeting major Russian oil companies and their overseas operations add another operational dimension: sanctions do not immediately change physical refinery barrels, but they constrain financing, spare parts, and trade relationships that affect maintenance and exports. Treasury listings of Rosneft and Lukoil subsidiaries identify the key refinery assets at risk of secondary impacts, while reporting highlights possible knock‑on effects on joint ventures—such as stakes in foreign refineries—and major buyers in Asia, which could force changes in export routes or pricing [6] [7]. Sanctions therefore amplify technical and security constraints by raising transaction costs and complicating long‑term upkeep, pressuring runs even where nameplate capacity remains unchanged.
5. Reconciling the View: Installed Capacity Intact, Throughput Fragile and Variable
Putting the sources together shows a consistent pattern: Russia still possesses large installed refining capacity, but throughput has been persistently and episodically depressed or disrupted since 2022. Statista’s installed capacity figure frames the structural baseline, while 2024 analyses and 2025 reporting on offline volumes document sizable idle and offline pockets driven by maintenance, sanctions impacts, and targeted attacks [1] [4] [3]. Policymakers and markets must therefore read two numbers: the headline capacity that signals potential resilience, and the operational runs and idle statistics that reveal real‑time vulnerabilities and where product bottlenecks or export surges may arise [1] [5].