What are the main arguments in the Energy Transition Minerals / Greenland Minerals arbitration over the uranium ban and historical permits?
Executive summary
Energy Transition Minerals (ETM), via its subsidiary Greenland Minerals (GM/GMAS), argues Greenland’s 2021 uranium ban and subsequent refusal to grant an exploitation licence amount to expropriation and breach of its exploration/exploitation rights, seeking roughly US$11–11.5 billion in compensation; Greenland and Denmark counter that the ban lawfully prohibits uranium-related mining, that GM never had a guaranteed right to an exploitation permit or a legitimate expectation to receive one, and that jurisdiction and remedial questions belong in domestic courts or follow the arbitration panel’s procedural thresholds [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. Background: the Kvanefjeld deposit, licences and the 2021 Uranium Act
Kvanefjeld (Kuannersuit) hosts one of the world’s largest undeveloped rare-earth and uranium-bearing deposits and has been explored under a long-standing exploration permit obtained by the company now called ETM beginning in 2007 and advanced through feasibility and permitting phases through the 2010s [4] [5]. Greenland’s 2021 Uranium Act bans prospecting, exploration and exploitation of uranium and any deposit whose average uranium content exceeds 100 ppm, with criminal penalties and power to restrict or revoke licences—legislation that effectively blocked Kvanefjeld because its uranium concentration is reported at roughly 300 ppm [6] [4] [7].
2. Claimant’s central legal arguments: property, legitimate expectation and expropriation
ETM/GM contends its historic exploration licence conferred property-like rights to minerals it delineated, and that those rights or a legitimate expectation of an exploitation licence were defeated when Greenland halted the licensing process after the 2021 Act—constituting breach of contract/administrative unfairness and indirect expropriation, for which it seeks compensation up to approximately US$11–11.5 billion (alleged fair market value) or lower figures if uranium can be disregarded [2] [3] [8] [9]. ETM also argues environmental concerns could be managed by “best environmental practice” rather than a blanket ban, framing the law as a regulatory taking rather than a bona fide public-health restriction [8] [10].
3. Respondents’ counter-arguments: sovereign regulation, absence of guaranteed licence and jurisdictional defences
Greenland (and Denmark, joined due to Denmark’s historical role in licence issuance and retained defence powers) insists the Uranium Act is a lawful exercise of Greenlandic self-government to protect health and environment, that the law expressly contemplates restricting or revoking licences, and that GM never had an automatic or vested right to an exploitation licence or a legitimate expectation of one—arguments raising both merits and jurisdictional barriers to ETM’s claim [2] [6] [3]. Respondents have also argued the dispute should be determined in Greenlandic courts for some issues and that Denmark’s involvement is limited, creating procedural fights over forum and tribunal competence [2] [3].
4. Technical and legal cruxes: uranium content thresholds, licence scope and remedies
At the heart of the legal fight lie technical questions—whether the exploration licence conferred a property right to minerals located (or merely a permit to explore), whether the licence implied entitlement to a future exploitation permit, and whether the statutory 100 ppm uranium threshold applies retroactively to previously granted permits—matters that will determine if the ban is a lawful regulatory measure or an actionable expropriation [2] [1] [4]. Remedies-focused disputes extend to quantifying damages: ETM’s wider valuation includes all elements at Kuannersuit, while Greenland disputes incremental damages and standing [2] [11].
5. Stakes, asymmetries and political context shaping the dispute
The claimed damages—more than Greenland’s annual budget—raise acute political stakes and have mobilised local anti-uranium movements and environmental groups who view the ban as protecting livelihoods and ecology; conversely, ETM and some industry and security observers stress rare-earths’ strategic value for green technologies and argue the ban undermines supply security [11] [8] [4]. External geopolitical interest, including commentary about Denmark’s role and earlier lobbying to lift uranium bans, colors perceptions of investor power versus local democratic choice [12] [10].
6. Procedural posture and likely implications
The arbitration—initiated in 2022–2023 under an exploration licence clause that references a Copenhagen forum—has produced jurisdictional skirmishes and parallel moves to litigate in domestic courts; recent reporting shows panels and advocates framing the dispute as testing Greenland’s autonomy to regulate minerals and emphasizing that some issues may be remitted to national courts before damages are assessed [2] [1] [11]. The tribunal’s rulings on jurisdiction, legitimate expectations and whether the ban is a bona fide public interest regulation will determine whether the case proceeds to an expensive merits and damages phase or whether Greenland’s law stands without multi-billion-dollar liability [2] [11].