Any up to date statistic i.e. 2023 or later showing Muslim contribution to Britains economy
Executive summary
Recent public estimates of Muslim contributions to the UK economy vary but cluster in the tens of billions of pounds: long-cited figures of “around £31 billion” originate from Muslim community reports and were repeated in parliamentary statements [1] [2] [3], while more recent Parliamentary references and sector analyses offer alternative estimates—£25 billion for Muslim-owned businesses in one 2025 debate [4] and sectoral/charitable figures such as £2.2 billion in annual giving from an Equi report [5]. No single ONS-issued, post-2021 headline number isolating “Muslim contribution” to UK GDP appears in the provided sources, so estimates depend on differing methodologies and definitions (population, businesses, spending power, charitable giving).
1. The headline numbers and where they come from
The oft-repeated “£31 billion” number appears across multiple reports and media since 2013, originating in Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)-linked analyses and echoed in media coverage and parliamentary remarks [1] [2] [6] [3], while a later parliamentary contribution in 2025 cites a £25 billion annual contribution from Muslim-owned businesses specifically [4]. A 2024–25 Equi report and related press coverage emphasise charitable and third‑sector value—estimating Muslim donor giving at roughly £2.2 billion a year and linking Muslim-led charity interventions to public-sector savings [5] [7]. These figures are not mutually exclusive—some measure business gross value added, some measure spending power, and others measure giving.
2. Why the range exists: methods, definitions and politics
Differences in headline totals stem from methodology: “contribution to the economy” can mean business gross value added, consumer spending power, jobs created, or fiscal impact after taxes—reports cited here use different bases without a single harmonised ONS-style breakdown [7] [1] [4]. Political actors have also deployed different figures for advocacy or policy aims: the MCB and sympathetic commentators highlight larger totals to demonstrate economic weight [1] [2], while parliamentary debates invoke numbers to underscore community value or policy concerns [3] [4]. Where a source is an advocacy group or press release, its implicit agenda—to boost recognition of Muslim economic and civic contributions—should be recognised alongside its data [7] [8].
3. Recent demographic context that shapes economic impact
The Muslim population in England and Wales grew to roughly 3.87–4.13 million in datasets and estimates from 2021–2023, representing about 6–6.5% of the population, and a relatively young age profile that analysts describe as a “demographic dividend” for the labour market [9] [10] [11] [12]. That population base is the underlying driver of spending power figures (often quoted around £20–20.5 billion in older MCB analyses) and employment/business contributions cited in the reports [1] [2] [13]. However, reporting also notes uneven labour-market outcomes and regional unemployment pockets that complicate simple positive narratives [10] [12].
4. What can be said with confidence — and what remains uncertain
It is supportable from the provided sources to say British Muslims make multi‑billion‑pound contributions across business activity, consumer spending and charitable giving: estimates in public discussion commonly fall in the £20–£31 billion range for business/spending contributions, with charitable giving around £2.2 billion annually per Equi [4] [1] [5]. What cannot be verified from the supplied material is a single, up‑to‑date ONS or Treasury figure for “Muslim contribution to Britain’s economy” for 2023 or later that uses standard national-accounting measures; the sources are a mix of advocacy reports, parliamentary remarks and press items with differing scopes and methodologies [7] [3] [8]. For a precise, comparable statistic one would need an ONS-style breakdown or peer‑reviewed economic decomposition explicitly attributing GVA and tax/fiscal flows to religious identity—such a dataset is not present in the provided reporting.