How much oil or other dependencies does Russia have in Venezuela?

1. Russia’s tangible assets: what Moscow actually owns and operates

Russian presence is centered on Roszarubezhneft, a company incorporated in 2020 that bought the Venezuelan holdings formerly run by Rosneft and now operates two oilfields through a Moscow-based unit, Petromost, under joint ventures with state oil company PDVSA — deals Venezuelan legislators extended for 15 years in late 2025 and that include roughly $616 million of planned investment ^{[2] [1]}.

2. Scale versus rhetoric: how big is Russia’s share in production and reserves?

Reporting points to Russia’s role as significant politically and strategically but limited in volumetric terms: articles document the Roszarubezhneft joint ventures and asset transfers but do not show Moscow holding the largest foreign entitlements in Venezuela — Chinese firms, by contrast, hold much larger oil entitlements (Sinopec 2.8 billion barrels, CNPC 1.6 billion barrels), and Chinese capital has historically been the larger foreign investor in the sector ^[3]; independent data in the reporting do not quantify Russia’s share of total Venezuelan output beyond the descriptions of specific joint ventures ^{[1] [4]}.

3. Constraints on Russia’s leverage: sanctions, decay and capital needs

Two structural realities limit how dependent Venezuela is on Russia for a rapid or large-scale production rebound: PDVSA remains under U.S. sanctions that deter many partners, and Venezuela’s oil infrastructure has been degraded by decades of underinvestment and mismanagement, requiring tens of billions — analysts point to figures like $100 billion to restore output from roughly 1 million barrels per day to several million over a decade — costs and timelines that exceed the scope of the $616 million Roszarubezhneft program ^{[1] [4] [5]}.

4. Political insurance, not total control: what Russia gains from its deals

The 15-year extension and ownership transfers buy Russia political and commercial footholds that can be valuable for bilateral leverage and crude-swap arrangements under sanctions pressure, but they stop short of turning Venezuela into a de facto Russian oil colony; reporting shows Moscow consolidating assets and long-term contracts as a strategic hedge, not an immediate volumetric substitute for China or potential Western investors if sanctions lift ^{[2] [1] [3]}.

5. Alternative scenarios and what would change Russia’s role

If international sanctions ease and global majors re-enter — a process analysts warn would still take years and tens of billions of dollars — the balance of foreign influence could shift toward U.S. and other Western companies, diluting Moscow’s relative importance; conversely, if sanctions persist and Venezuela leans further into geopolitical alignment with Russia and China, Moscow’s long-term contracts and political ties could translate into steadier energy access, though the reporting underscores the gulf between strategic position and the vast capital needed to raise output materially ^{[5] [4] [6]}.

6. Bottom line: meaningful, but not dominant

The available reporting shows Russia holding specific, state-backed oil assets in Venezuela (former Rosneft holdings now under Roszarubezhneft) and securing a 15‑year extension of joint ventures with roughly $616 million in associated investment — a concrete and politically significant stake — but not a commanding share of Venezuela’s reserves or production when compared with China’s larger entitlements or the scale of investment required to revive the industry ^{[1] [2] [3]}. Where Moscow’s influence matters most is political insurance and access to Venezuelan crude under sanctions, not immediate volumetric dominance of Venezuelan oil exports ^{[1] [4]}.