What changes to tariffs and trade policy occurred during the Trump administration and in the post-2024 period?
Executive summary
The Trump administration’s trade posture evolved from targeted “trade war” tariffs in its first term into a far broader, legally novel and more aggressive tariff regime after 2024 that raised average effective U.S. tariff rates sharply, invoked emergency authorities and expanded the universe of imports subject to duties [1] [2] [3]. Those moves produced large revenue gains for the Treasury, spawned legal challenges and WTO disputes, and prompted both tailored exemptions and bilateral “reciprocal” negotiations to pare back some measures [1] [3] [4].
1. The baseline: Trump’s first-term tariffs and the post-2020 carryover
The foundational change in U.S. trade policy under President Trump’s first term was the use of tariffs as a direct instrument of industrial and strategic policy—most notably Section 232 steel and aluminum duties and Section 301 tariffs on China—changes that survived in modified form into the Biden years, which maintained many of those levies while substituting limited accommodations such as tariff-rate quotas and temporary suspensions for some partners [1] [5] [6].
2. Scale and mechanics of the post‑2024 tariff expansion
After the 2024 election, the administration scaled tariffs from a targeted tool into a sweeping, administratively driven program: the share of U.S. goods imports subject to tariffs rose dramatically (from hundreds of billions to over $2 trillion by May 2025), and new “reciprocal” tariffs and higher sectoral levies were introduced—examples cited include steel, aluminum and copper hiked to 50% and a 25% tariff on imported cars under Section 232 in the new policy architecture [3] [7]. The administration also invoked authorities such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Trade Expansion Act in novel ways to implement global measures [8] [7].
3. The economics: higher effective rates, revenue and distributional costs
Independent trackers and research groups put the magnitude in stark terms: estimates of the U.S. average effective tariff rate rose from roughly 2–3% at the end of 2024 to double digits in 2025, with J.P. Morgan and others estimating mid- to high‑teens and scenario work from Yale and tax-policy centers calculating a large lift in tariff incidence on households and a drag on GDP and employment [2] [9] [10]. Customs duty receipts surged—reported totals through 2024–25 reached the hundreds of billions of dollars—while analyses warned the costs to households would be regressive and macroeconomically meaningful [1] [9] [10].
4. Legal friction, international backlash and institutional strain
The speed and scope of post‑2024 measures generated immediate legal fights and multilateral pushback: U.S. courts (including the Court of International Trade) and the Supreme Court were asked to weigh the legality of IEEPA-based tariffs, and several trading partners launched WTO disputes even as U.S. budgetary and appointments actions had already debilitated the WTO Appellate Body, complicating formal dispute resolution [2] [3]. The U.S. also signaled indefinite suspension of some WTO budget contributions, amplifying institutional tensions [3].
5. Negotiation, carve‑outs and tactical reversals
Confronting political and economic pressures, the administration paired big tariffs with negotiation and exemptions: reciprocal tariffs were selectively modified after bilateral deals and executive orders removed or narrowed coverage for certain agricultural and other products, and the White House framed negotiations as yielding framework and final agreements that could exempt goods from reciprocal duties [4] [8] [11]. Markets and analysts noted that many tariffs were implemented gradually, with pauses, exemptions and negotiated lower rates for some countries [12] [2].
6. Bottom line and near-term outlook
The post‑2024 period represents a break from decades of relatively low U.S. tariff reliance: policy moved from selective protection and enforcement of trade rules to an aggressive, instrument-heavy strategy combining very high sectoral rates, country‑level “reciprocal” levies, emergency legal authorities and active bargaining to trade back exemptions—producing higher revenues, distributional costs, legal uncertainty and strained multilateral institutions [3] [1] [2] [9]. The near-term trajectory will depend on litigation outcomes, bilateral deals that carve out exemptions, and whether Congress or the courts limit the executive’s use of emergency statutes to impose broad, economy-wide tariffs [2] [5].