Which specific Trump-owned casino entities filed for bankruptcy and which creditors were impacted?

1. Which Trump-owned casino entities filed for bankruptcy

The earliest and most cited filing was Trump Taj Mahal’s Chapter 11 in 1991, brought by the borrower entity often called Trump Taj Mahal Associates (documented by a bankruptcy trade summary and historical reporting) ^[1]; Trump Plaza followed with its own corporate distress and related filings in 1992 under Trump Plaza Associates as part of Atlantic City restructuring activity ^{[4] [1]}; and the umbrella public company Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts—later renamed Trump Entertainment Resorts—filed multiple Chapter 11 cases in the 2000s, with formal filings recorded in 2004, again in 2009 and yet again in 2014 as the company struggled with bond payments and the recession’s fallout ^{[2] [1]}.

2. Who the creditors were and how they were impacted

The dominant creditors were public bondholders who had financed the casino builds with high‑yield “junk” bonds and other structured debt, and those bondholders accepted restructurings that converted old debt into new securities worth substantially less than the claims they replaced — in one analysis bondholders received new paper valued at roughly a third less than outstanding debt on major properties such as the Taj Mahal and Castle/Marina financings ^[3]; commercial lenders and banks that held syndicated loans likewise faced haircuts or negotiated new terms during the Chapter 11 reorganizations ^[1].

3. Quantified debt exchanges cited in reporting

Reporting and tax‑policy analysis reconstructed the scale of the exchanges: lenders refinanced roughly $860 million of debt tied to the Taj Mahal and about $336 million for Trump Castle (sometimes called Trump Marina) during restructurings, with bondholders taking newly issued instruments that reflected deep discounts compared with the original claims ^[3]; separate coverage also notes Trump Entertainment Resorts missed a roughly $53.1 million bond interest payment in December 2008, an event that precipitated later restructuring moves that harmed bondholder recoveries ^[1].

4. Secondary creditors and affected stakeholders beyond bondholders

Beyond financial creditors, employees, pension claimants and minority shareholders were materially affected: academic and congressional reports documented large job losses and revenue declines at Trump’s Atlantic City casinos across the restructuring years, and some employees and small investors holding Trump stock or related claims saw forced sales or sharply reduced recoveries as corporate control shifted to creditors or new owners ^{[5] [6]}.

5. How these bankruptcies differed from a personal bankruptcy and the narratives around them

The filings were corporate Chapter 11 restructurings of business entities and not personal bankruptcies for Donald Trump himself — a distinction repeatedly highlighted in fact‑checks and summaries even as critics emphasize the human and creditor costs; proponents and Trump himself framed Chapter 11 as a legally permissible tool for restructuring and preserving value, while reporters and scholars emphasize that much of the economic pain was borne by lenders, bondholders and workers rather than by Trump personally ^{[7] [4]}.

6. Limits of available reporting and remaining open questions

Public sources and retrospective analyses outline which corporate entities filed and summarize creditor outcomes in aggregate terms, but detailed, fully itemized creditor lists and dollar‑for‑dollar recoveries for every counterparty are not comprehensively compiled in the cited summaries; the available reporting therefore establishes the identities of the filings and the classes of creditors harmed (bondholders, banks, employees/shareholders) but does not supply a single exhaustive ledger of every impacted creditor and exact recovery amounts ^{[1] [3] [5]}.