Which bilateral trade agreements did the U.S. sign with countries under Donald Trump and after 2024?
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Executive summary
Donald Trump’s first term produced one major trilateral agreement he negotiated and signed: the USMCA, signed November–December 2018 and in force July 1, 2020 [1] [2]. After the 2024 election, reporting and government releases show a rapid push for one‑on‑one “reciprocal” deals and frameworks — the White House announced bilateral pacts or frameworks with the U.K., Japan, China, multiple Latin American countries and several others in 2025 [3] [4] [5] [6]. Sources disagree on legal formality: some are described as full trade deals, others as “frameworks” or agreements reached under emergency authorities and IEEPA rather than traditional FTAs [7] [8].
1. Trump’s first term: USMCA was the headline trade achievement
The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) replaced NAFTA and was negotiated under Trump, with formal signing rounds in late 2018 and entry into force July 1, 2020; analysts emphasize it largely modernized NAFTA rules on IP and digital trade rather than creating a wide new network of bilateral FTAs [1] [2].
2. Between administrations: Biden-era initiatives left a mixed ledger
The Biden administration pursued new “21st Century” and sectoral arrangements (for example, a U.S.-Taiwan initiative and an Indo‑Pacific Economic Framework with limited trade pillar outcomes) and maintained a suite of existing FTAs; USTR materials list multiple ongoing negotiations and agreements in 2023–24 but several multilateral initiatives stalled or omitted trade pillars [9] [10].
3. After 2024: White House claims of multiple bilateral wins
From 2025 onward the White House publicly announced a string of bilateral and bilateral‑style deals: a U.S.–U.K. “historic trade deal” announced May 2025, a China trade and economic deal in November 2025, and a suite of reciprocal trade agreements or frameworks with Japan, Switzerland/Liechtenstein, Cambodia, Malaysia, and several Latin American countries among others [3] [4] [5] [11] [6]. Coverage shows these ranged from tariff arrangements to purchase commitments (China) and tariff caps (Japan), but not all were described in sources as classic free‑trade agreements [4] [12] [13].
4. Frameworks, emergency powers and legal form: key points of disagreement
Analysts note many post‑2024 arrangements were negotiated as “frameworks” or under emergency statutes like IEEPA rather than through conventional FTA processes that require congressional implementation. Commentators warn this produces uncertain legal permanence and could leave partners “in limbo” compared with standard FTAs [7] [14] [8]. Supply Chain Dive characterized some accords as “framework agreements” rather than completed FTAs [11].
5. Substance versus style: tariffs, purchase commitments and trade access
White House fact sheets describe concrete outcomes—tariff fixes with the U.K., tariff reductions and investment pledges with Japan, tariff and purchase commitments with China—while independent analysts and trade lawyers emphasize these often sit alongside a new U.S. “reciprocal tariff” regime and may preserve unilateral tariff authorities rather than mutual, binding tariff schedules [3] [4] [12] [8].
6. Regional focus and geopolitical intent
Reporting and analysis agree the post‑2024 agenda prioritizes bilateralism and geopolitical goals: several deals aim to limit Chinese influence, secure supply chains in the Western Hemisphere, or extract investment commitments [7] [14]. Brookings and Carnegie commentary situates this as a deliberate pivot from multilateral rule‑making toward one‑on‑one leverage [15] [16].
7. What sources do not settle: which post‑2024 pacts are full FTAs?
Available sources document many announced agreements and frameworks (U.K., Japan, China, Latin American partners, Switzerland/Liechtenstein, Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, etc.) but do not uniformly state which of these are enacted as full, Congress‑implemented free trade agreements versus executive‑branch frameworks or tariff pacts implemented under presidential authority [3] [4] [11] [6]. For several listings sources call them “frameworks,” “agreements,” or “joint statements” rather than formal FTAs [7] [11].
8. Takeaway and implications for partners and business
The factual record shows Trump’s first administration produced USMCA (trilateral) as its major negotiated outcome [1] [2]. After 2024 the administration pursued a rapid sequence of bilateral and framework deals with major economies and regional partners; coverage and analysts flag important differences in legal form, use of emergency authorities, and potential instability compared with traditional FTAs [3] [5] [7]. Companies and partners should treat announced pacts as politically significant but uneven in permanence and enforceability based on current reporting [14] [7].
Limitations: this summary uses only the provided reporting. Available sources do not provide a definitive, item‑by‑item legal list showing which post‑2024 agreements have been converted into full, Congress‑approved FTAs; they instead mix White House fact sheets, media reports and analyst commentary that label deals variously as “deals,” “frameworks,” or “agreements” [3] [5] [6].