How have US sanctions and Venezuelan politics affected access to critical minerals since 2020?
Executive summary
U.S. sanctions since 2018–2020 targeted Venezuela’s oil sector, banks and state gold company Minerven, blocking U.S. persons from dealing with those entities and restricting export of dual-use technologies—measures that curtailed formal, licit access to Venezuelan minerals and pushed much trade into illicit channels [1] [2] [3]. Venezuelan politics—centered on the Maduro government’s control of the Orinoco Mining Arc and reliance on military and criminal networks—has turned critical-minerals extraction into a shadow economy, widening flows to non‑Western buyers and criminal intermediaries even as international partners (India, China, Turkey, UAE) show growing commercial interest [4] [5] [6].
1. Sanctions narrowed legal entry points for miners and traders
U.S. executive orders and OFAC designations froze assets and prohibited U.S. persons from transacting with PdVSA, the Central Bank, Minerven and other state entities, and broadened export controls on dual‑use goods—measures that explicitly curtailed legitimate commercial ties to Venezuela’s mineral sector and complicated investment in refining and processing capacity [1] [3] [7].
2. Targeting of Minerven made gold and refined output especially fraught
The Treasury designated state gold processor Minerven in March 2019, citing illicit operations that propped up Maduro; that step, and subsequent orders restricting “corrupt or deceptive” gold sales, removed formal routes to sell state-processed gold and forced markets to rely on clandestine supply chains and third‑country refineries [2] [8] [9].
3. Political economy in Caracas turned minerals into a revenue lifeline
Available reporting documents how the Maduro government, the military and allied networks consolidated control over mining zones and used extractive rents to survive sanctions, making minerals—especially gold—the de facto cash source for state and para‑state actors [2] [10] [11]. The Venezuelan “anti‑blockade” law of 2020 and state initiatives like Siembra Minera sought to reorient policy to bypass restrictions and attract investment under tight, politicized terms [12].
4. Sanctions produced unintended market diversion and evasion
Multiple sources show that sanctions fostered evasion: gold and other ores flowed to countries willing to flout Western restrictions—Turkey, the UAE, Suriname and regional intermediaries—while smugglers, armed groups and foreign middlemen integrated Venezuelan minerals into global value chains, undermining traceability [5] [9] [6].
5. Security vacuum and criminalization of critical‑minerals extraction
Scholars and investigative reporting describe the Orinoco Mining Arc and southern regions as dominated by armed groups, organized crime and guerrillas who exploit surges in global demand for coltan, tin, tungsten and other critical elements; that dynamic raises human‑rights, environmental and supply‑chain risk that sanctions alone have not resolved [13] [4] [6].
6. Global geopolitics rewired buyers and investors toward non‑Western partners
With Western firms constrained by sanctions and reputational risk, Venezuela increasingly courts non‑Western partners; 2025 diplomacy shows Caracas pressing India for critical‑minerals cooperation and Chinese buyers already dominate some export flows—illustrating how sanctions and politics reallocate resource access to strategic competitors [14] [15] [6].
7. Partial easing and the limits of policy leverage
U.S. general licenses and temporary suspensions (e.g., 2023–2024 license actions around oil and Minerven) demonstrate that sanctions policy can be calibrated to reward political steps, but lifted restrictions also risk accelerating environmental harm and criminal extraction if governance remains weak—reporting finds that rolling back sanctions can facilitate sales while leaving destructive mining practices intact [1] [16].
8. What this means for global critical‑minerals security
Taken together, the evidence shows sanctions reduced formal Western access to Venezuelan critical minerals while Venezuelan political control and illicit markets increased non‑transparent supply channels; that combination creates short‑term disruptions for buyers seeking ethically verifiable supply and long‑term risks for environmental and regional security [3] [4] [17].
Limitations and competing interpretations: U.S. government sources emphasize sanctions as tools to punish corruption and coerce political change; critics and regional analysts argue sanctions exacerbate illicit extraction and humanitarian harm—both positions appear in the record and neither is disproven by available reporting [1] [5] [11]. Available sources do not mention precise global volumes of Venezuelan coltan exports since 2020 or complete chain‑of‑custody data for all critical minerals, limiting quantitative assessment (not found in current reporting).