How do vendors on carding sites convert cryptocurrency to fiat (2023–2025)?
Executive summary
Vendors on carding and darknet markets convert crypto to fiat through a mix of commercial crypto‑fiat rails (crypto cards, payment gateways, exchanges) and illicit intermediaries: OTC brokers, mixers, money‑mule accounts and darknet “cash‑out” shops. Open‑market cash‑outs increasingly use crypto debit/credit cards or payment gateways that auto‑convert to fiat (examples: Coinbase, Transak, Gate.io, Bitget) while illicit routes rely on mixers, OTC traders, mule accounts and dedicated darknet cash‑out services that charge commissions up to ~15% [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6].
1. Legal rails: instant conversion via crypto cards and gateways
Mainstream vendors and some criminals use regulated crypto cards and payment rails that convert tokens to fiat at point of sale or allow withdrawals to bank accounts; major providers include crypto exchange cards (Coinbase, Gate.io, Crypto.com), white‑label on/off ramps such as Transak, and enterprise gateways that settle USDC to fiat — all of which perform automatic crypto→fiat conversion [1] [7] [2] [8]. Industry coverage in 2025 emphasizes instant conversion, multi‑currency support and debit/credit functionality that “eliminates the need to convert before spending” [9] [3] [4].
2. Centralised exchanges and CEX cash‑outs remain the prime legal offramps
Large centralised exchanges are a common fiat exit: users deposit crypto and withdraw fiat to bank accounts. Chainalysis and reporting found most black‑market cash‑outs funnel through a small number of exchanges, concentrating risk and enabling law enforcement tracing when CEX AML/KYC are enforced [10] [11] [12]. Vendors sometimes move cash into a mainstream CEX, buy BTC and then use that to transact on fraud shops — illustrating how legal rails are folded into illicit flows [13].
3. Illicit intermediaries: mixers, OTCs and conversion services
When anonymity is the priority, criminals layer funds through mixers/tumblers, DeFi swaps, cross‑chain bridges and OTC traders. Mixers jumble inputs to obscure tx history; Chainalysis and DOJ actions show mixers and darknet conversion services have been key targets and remain central to laundering strategies [14] [15] [11]. Tactical reports find OTC brokers and nested OTC services used to “launder stolen cryptocurrency into fiat money,” sometimes prompting OFAC sanctions [16].
4. Darknet cash‑out shops, mule networks and nominee accounts
Dark web vendors advertise direct crypto‑to‑fiat cash‑out services, selling ready‑made crypto‑to‑fiat accounts and nominee/mule services that let criminals receive fiat with some legal insulation. Transparency International’s dark‑web trawl found intermediaries offering pre‑built accounts at providers like Wirex held in nominees; Flashpoint and other analysts documented darknet cash‑out vendors charging variable commissions and offering payments into regional rails (QIWI, Tinkoff, prepaid cards) for a fee [6] [5] [17].
5. Pricing, risk and shifting post‑Hydra market dynamics
Post‑Hydra takedowns shifted the ecosystem: cash‑out services proliferated on forums and commissions vary — Flashpoint recorded up to 15% fees depending on “cleanness,” while other services advertise lower spreads for more routine conversions [5]. Dark web markets broadened offerings to include money‑laundering tools and fiat offramps as a formalized service, meaning vendors often outsource cash‑out to specialist providers [18] [5].
6. Law enforcement pressure, consolidation and tracking tradeoffs
Enforcement actions (ChipMixer takedown, OFAC sanctions, CEX prosecutions) show investigators can disrupt mixers and key brokers, and that a small set of exchanges handle a disproportionate share of illicit cash‑outs — making concentrated countermeasures effective [14] [19] [10]. At the same time, studies warn criminals adapt via cross‑chain moves, privacy coins and mule networks, reducing the utility of blockchain transparency alone [20] [21] [15].
7. What reporting does not say (limitations)
Available sources document the tools and patterns but do not provide a single, comprehensive playbook of “how vendors do it” step‑by‑step for 2023–2025; detailed operational manuals are found only in closed forums and specialist guides beyond these reports [5] [22]. Quantitative totals for darknet cash‑outs specifically tied to carding vendors are not supplied in the cited material — analysts instead give broader illicit‑flow figures and case studies [11] [12].
Conclusion — two competing realities: legitimate crypto‑fiat infrastructure now makes conversion trivial and compliant (crypto cards, gateways, CEX cash‑outs), but the illicit market has matured parallel cash‑out services (mixers, OTCs, mule accounts, darknet shops) that monetize anonymity at significant cost and risk to operators; law enforcement pressure concentrates and sometimes compresses those pathways but does not eliminate them [1] [2] [5] [19].