Which darknet markets or forums historically hosted carding vendors (2020–2024)?

1. What the source analyses actually claim — big, specific allegations that matter

The assembled analyses make several specific claims: Savastan0 sold over 15 million stolen card records and operated like a commercial e‑commerce site with verification fees and search filters, with most cards issued by U.S. banks and Visa representing the largest share ^[1]. Academic and industry studies claim that carding operates as a multi‑layered business model—vendors, resellers, CaaS providers, money mules, and forum administrators—and that carding channels include darknet markets, specialized carder shops, and encrypted communication channels ^[3]. Historical marketplace studies show that dedicated card shops can generate very high revenue and apply sophisticated pricing, refund policies, and verification services, reflecting a mature underground commercial logic rather than ad‑hoc theft fences ^[2].

2. Who and what platforms are repeatedly named in the evidence set

The analyses list a mix of named actors and market types: Savastan0 is singled out as a major, modern carding marketplace; legacy darknet markets such as AlphaBay, Hansa, Dream Market, Silk Road and others are referenced as historically important but largely dismantled before 2020, pushing activity into new venues and specialized shops ^{[1] [2] [4]}. The documents also reference smaller or niche carding vendors and storefronts—Saint Partick CVV SHOP, BOSSCARDS, DOCTORCARD MARKETPLACE, and ODIN CC among others—implying that between 2020 and 2024 much activity resided on dedicated carder storefronts and forums rather than only on broad darknet bazaars ^{[5] [2]}.

3. How the business worked — pricing, verification, and scale indicators that matter

Multiple analyses converge on the point that carding operations adopted retail‑style features: searchable inventories, tiered pricing by BIN/bank/security features, card verification services for a fee, and refund policies, all designed to build trust and scale sales ^{[1] [2]}. The scraped revenue figures and shop metrics show card‑focused marketplaces could generate tens of millions in gross revenue over multi‑year periods, with magnetic‑stripe and card‑not‑present (CNP) products accounting for most sales, indicating high commercial profitability and repeat‑buyer dynamics ^{[2] [3]}. These mechanics explain why criminal demand sustains specialized shops even as larger darknet markets are disrupted.

4. Law enforcement pressure, market churn, and the shift to niche venues

The sources document an enduring pattern: after major takedowns of broad darknet markets (e.g., AlphaBay, Hansa), actors migrated to nomadic, pseudonymous vendors, invite‑only forums, and verticalized card shops that replicate e‑commerce features while reducing exposure to large public marketplaces ^{[4] [3]}. Industry reporting and academic work indicate that market resilience arises from repeated re‑emergence under new names, private promotion inside carding communities, and use of encrypted comms, making interdiction more complex despite periodic law enforcement successes ^{[4] [6]}. The implication is that 2020–2024 saw dispersion rather than elimination of carding vendors.

5. What the evidence omits and why that matters for assessing 2020–2024 activity

The assembled analyses provide credible traces but also notable gaps: direct, contemporaneous listings tying specific darknet markets to active 2020–2024 carding vendor storefronts are limited, and some reports emphasize ecosystem dynamics over platform‑by‑platform attribution ^{[6] [4]}. Several pieces rely on historical patterns or on studies of single large shops pre‑2019, meaning the picture for 2020–2024 leans on inference from business models and a few high‑impact cases like Savastan0 rather than exhaustive platform inventories ^{[2] [6]}. This omission cautions against treating any single list as comprehensive; the carding ecology remained fluid, with activity migrating across forum types and closed communities.

6. Bottom line for investigators, payment firms, and policymakers

The evidence establishes that dedicated carder marketplaces and closed forums were the primary hosts for carding vendors in the 2020–2024 window, supported by industrialized verification and pricing mechanics that made these operations highly scalable and profitable ^{[1] [2] [5]}. Historic takedowns of large darknet bazaars shifted vendor behavior toward smaller, specialized shops and invite‑only forums, complicating detection and enforcement ^[4]. Stakeholders should therefore prioritize intelligence on vertical carder shops, monitoring of verification and reseller services, and disruption of money‑laundering and mule networks to address the most consequential actors identified in these analyses ^{[3] [1]}.