What reported prosecutions resulted from takedowns of CVV/BIN sellers between 2019 and 2025?

1. The visible underground: marketplaces and sales activity, not court dockets

Multiple supplied sources catalog active CVV/BIN marketplaces and seller posts offering “fresh” CVVs, fullz, and BIN lists — from darkweb market descriptions at DarkStash to long-standing carding forums and carding-shop storefronts that openly sell BIN lists and CVV dumps ^{[1] [2] [5]}. These materials establish the operational landscape in which CVV/BIN sellers operate, but they are marketplace snapshots and guides rather than law-enforcement case reports and therefore do not themselves report prosecutions tied to takedowns ^{[1] [2] [5]}.

2. Technical reporting documents harm and techniques, not prosecutions

Cybersecurity vendors and fraud-prevention blogs in the package explain BIN-attack mechanics and CVV brute-force testing — descriptions that underpin why CVV/BIN sellers matter to banks and merchants — but these explain detection and mitigation rather than naming defendants or criminal cases resulting from takedowns ^{[3] [4] [7]}. For example, Arkose Labs and industry write-ups describe BIN attack methodology and its effects on authorization flows but do not convert that technical context into a record of prosecutions in the supplied reporting ^{[3] [7]}.

3. Enforcement examples in the set are adjacent, not direct

One supplied government enforcement document concerns financial‑sector regulation and an enforcement action involving a cryptocurrency platform (FinCEN consent order referencing Binance activities), which illustrates that regulators pursue abuse in payment-related ecosystems, yet it does not document a prosecution of CVV/BIN sellers or a criminal indictment emerging from a marketplace takedown in the provided material ^[6]. Another public-prosecution item in the collection relates to cartel prosecutions in Australia and is unrelated to payment‑card fraud, underscoring a gap between available prosecution reporting and the CVV/BIN seller topic ^[8].

4. What the sources do allow: prevalence plus a reporting gap on prosecutions

Taken together, the supplied sources reliably show prevalence, marketplace resilience, and evolving attacker techniques — including commercial CVV shops, bin lists for sale, and guides for “silent testing” in 2024–25 — but they do not include case narratives, indictments, sentencing memoranda, or press releases that tie specific enforcement takedowns (2019–2025) to named prosecutions of CVV/BIN sellers ^{[1] [5] [9] [2]}. Therefore, based on the provided reporting, no specific prosecutions resulting from takedowns in that interval can be documented here.

5. Alternative explanations and implicit agendas in the material

The marketplace and “how-to” content serves vendor marketing and community reputation building — a motivation to inflate “freshness” and success rates that can obscure law-enforcement visibility ^{[2] [5]}. Vendor and forum material is unlikely to report prosecutions against themselves, and cybersecurity vendor write-ups focus on defense rather than naming prosecutions, which creates an asymmetry in publicly available narratives that biases this dataset away from prosecution records ^{[1] [3]}.

6. Conclusion and limitation of this analysis

A direct answer grounded strictly in the supplied sources: the reporting provided documents markets, BIN/CVV techniques, and adjacent regulatory action, but does not report any named prosecutions that resulted from takedowns of CVV/BIN sellers between 2019 and 2025; absent additional law‑enforcement press releases, court records, or investigative reporting beyond these sources, no prosecutions can be cited here ^{[1] [3] [6] [5]}. If authoritative prosecution details are required, the next steps are targeted searches of DOJ, Europol, national police press releases, and court dockets for indictments or guilty pleas specifying CVV/BIN seller takedowns during 2019–2025.