What routes and maritime corridors are most used to traffic drugs from Venezuela to the Caribbean and US?
Executive summary
Drug flows from Venezuela use multiple maritime corridors: the Caribbean route from Venezuela’s northeastern coast (including Margarita Island and Sucre state) to the Eastern Caribbean and onward to Europe and the U.S. eastern seaboard, but most U.S.-bound shipments historically travel via the Eastern Pacific or the Western Caribbean rather than directly from Venezuela’s Caribbean coast; U.S. government estimates put Venezuela’s transit at roughly 200–250 metric tons annually in 2020 and attribute the Eastern Pacific with about 80% of U.S.-bound drug flow [1] [2] [3]. Recent U.S. military action in the Caribbean has targeted boats reportedly operating from Venezuelan coastal hubs like Margarita and Güiria and officials claim it has disrupted a “Caribbean route” carrying hundreds of tons in 2024, while analysts warn maritime interdiction will not stop the larger Pacific-dominated trade [4] [5] [6].
1. Caribbean coastal chokepoints: Margarita, Sucre and Güiria — small boats and island-to-island hops
Reporting and organized‑crime analysis identify Venezuela’s northeastern coast — notably Margarita Island and parts of Sucre state — as a staging ground for fast boat departures to nearby Caribbean islands (Martinique, Guadeloupe, Eastern Caribbean destinations) and onward transits [4] [7]. InsightCrime and regional reporting say gangs such as Tren de Aragua seek control of these territories to “establish direct transportation routes to the islands of the Eastern Caribbean,” and U.S. strikes in late 2025 focused on suspected small-vessel movements from those hubs [7] [4].
2. The larger picture: Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean carry the bulk of U.S.-bound flows
Multiple government and analytical sources emphasize that most cocaine destined for the United States moves through the Eastern Pacific or the Western Caribbean rather than the direct Venezuela-to-U.S. Caribbean corridor. SOUTHCOM and UN/analysts estimate roughly 80% of U.S.-bound flows go by the Eastern Pacific, leaving a minority share for Caribbean routes; the March 2025 State Department and earlier DEA figures place Venezuelan-trafficked volumes around 200–250 metric tons annually at one point — significant but not the dominant pathway to the U.S. [1] [2] [3].
3. How traffickers move product: sea, air bridges, and re-export to Europe
Sources document a mix of maritime shipments, clandestine flights and island trans-shipments. Historical reporting and government claims reference an “air bridge” and sea channels used to move cocaine from Colombia through Venezuela to Central America, the Caribbean and directly to Europe, with some direct sea shipments from Venezuelan ports to European destinations [8] [1]. UNODC mapping in the World Drug Report 2025 visually shows multiple maritime routes by water from northern South America across the Caribbean and northward [9].
4. U.S. interdiction and military campaign: disruption claims and contested impact
U.S. military and administration sources have asserted a major disruption of the “Caribbean route,” with some outlets reporting the campaign “effectively shut down” busy maritime departures and interdicted hundreds of tons estimated for 2024 [5] [10]. Critics and experienced counter‑drug operators warn lethal strikes and militarized tactics likely will not stop the larger cartels, calling the approach “whack-a-mole” and noting that most trafficker networks shift routes and methods when pressured [6] [1].
5. Data gaps, competing narratives and what sources don’t say
Available sources document volumes and routes inconsistently: some cite 200–250 MT through Venezuela in 2020, others claim 350–500 MT in 2024 tied to the Caribbean route — and UNODC/SOUTHCOM mapping shows Venezuela is part of a network but not always the dominant corridor to North America [1] [5] [2]. Sources do not present conclusive, public evidence linking fentanyl manufacture or primary fentanyl flows to Venezuela [1]. Detailed, verifiable, route-by-route seizure data for 2023–24 exist in UNODC maps but are not fully summarized in the reporting above [9]. Available sources do not mention a definitive, single maritime “highway” that if eliminated would stop U.S. drug inflow.
6. What this means for policy and regional security
If the goal is to curb U.S. consumption-driven availability, policymakers confront a dispersed, adaptive trafficking system: maritime interdiction can deter departures from specific Venezuelan ports and islands in the short term (and has been credited with disrupting some island-to-island runs), but experts cited in commentary argue it will not cut off flows routed through the Eastern Pacific or other resilient corridors; evidence and maps in UNODC and U.S. analyses support that assessment [9] [3] [6]. The political framing of interdiction as part of regime pressure against Venezuelan authorities appears in U.S. administration rhetoric and in reporting that links strikes to efforts to “degrade” criminal revenue sources [5] [10].
Limitations: This analysis uses only the provided sources and cites them explicitly; many technical seizure datasets, bilateral law‑enforcement assessments and classified operational details are not available in these reports, and those omissions constrain definitive route-level claims [9] [1].