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How do Venezuelan criminal groups transport cocaine by boat to the Caribbean and Europe?
Executive Summary
Venezuelan criminal groups transport cocaine to the Caribbean and onward to Europe using a mix of maritime methods—go-fast boats, small fishing craft, semi-submersible “narco-subs,” and transshipment via island hopping and European overseas territories—exploiting weak controls, corruption, and regional low interdiction capacity; multiple seizures and mapping analyses from 2023–2025 document these patterns and point to shifting tactics in response to interdiction [1] [2] [3]. Recent high-profile law enforcement and military actions, including major Coast Guard seizures in 2025 and Atlantic narco-sub captures in November 2025, confirm these routes while also exposing contested evidence standards and human-rights concerns that shape how states respond [4] [3] [5].
1. How the boats move cocaine: speed, stealth, and sea routes that matter
Open-source mapping and analytical reports from 2023–2024 show cocaine leaving Venezuela by sea via the Guajira and Paraguaná peninsulas and following maritime corridors through the southern Caribbean toward island transshipment hubs; go-fast boats are frequently used for short, rapid crossings to nearby islands while larger consignments move on fishing vessels, cargo ships, or semi-submersible craft for longer transatlantic legs [1] [2]. Law-enforcement reporting and seizure records from 2025 document the same mix: interdictions recovered loads from many small, fast vessels and several narco-subs bound for Europe, confirming the multi-tiered pipeline where short-hop launches feed larger movements that can transit through Aruba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, or European overseas territories before reaching continental ports [4] [3].
2. Narco-subs and long-haul smuggling: a growing Atlantic headache
Seizures in 2025 show a notable increase in semi-submersible usage for Atlantic crossings, with Portuguese authorities seizing a narco-sub carrying 1.7 tonnes bound for the Iberian Peninsula in November 2025 and a previous March interdiction of 6.5 tonnes roughly 1,200 nautical miles from Lisbon; these incidents demonstrate that criminal groups use low-profile, long-range vessels to bridge the ocean gap to Europe, often crewing operations with multinational personnel and embedding logistics that bypass conventional port inspections [3]. Analysts and mapping data from earlier years anticipated these shifts as traffickers innovated around Caribbean interdiction gaps, and the 2025 narco-sub seizures confirm the projection that semi-submersibles are increasingly the tool of choice for transatlantic consignments [2] [3].
3. Transshipment hubs and Europe’s shadow routes: islands and overseas territories
Investigative and policy reports emphasize two principal patterns to reach Europe: direct ocean crossings and staged transfers through Caribbean hubs or European overseas territories, such as French Guiana, where cargo shipping or human couriers can move product onward to mainland Europe; island hopping reduces detection risk at sea while leveraging porous ports and corruptible supply chains on land [1] [2]. Seizure data and analysis from 2023–2025 indicate that traffickers deliberately mix modes—fast boats to move product to an island, then concealment on container ships or airline mules for final leg—so the route is often a hybrid of maritime and air logistics that varies with enforcement pressure and available infrastructure [4] [1].
4. Enforcement wins, political controversy, and unintended consequences
US and allied interdictions have produced large seizures—such as the 2025 US Coast Guard offload of over 76,000 pounds—but these operations have sparked legal and political disputes: authorities tout interdiction figures as major blows to criminal finances while critics and rights groups question evidence standards and civilian casualties from recent strikes, noting at least 70 deaths tied to US boat strikes through late 2025 and calls from international bodies for proof of narcotics presence in some targets; this tension highlights a policy trade-off between aggressive maritime suppression and legal, human-rights obligations [4] [5] [6]. The contested nature of some strikes complicates cooperation with regional governments and can drive traffickers to adapt—shifting to longer-range narco-subs or more clandestine transshipment—so enforcement success and the methods used both alter trafficking patterns and generate political backlash [7] [8].
5. Where the evidence converges and where uncertainty remains
Across mapping reports and law-enforcement seizures, there is strong, multi-year convergence that Venezuelan criminal groups use maritime routes—go-fast boats, fishing vessels, semi-submersibles, and island transshipment chains—to reach the Caribbean and Europe; major 2025 seizures and narco-sub captures corroborate those routes and show evolving tactics [1] [4] [3]. Uncertainty remains around attribution for specific incidents and the extent to which particular Venezuelan organizations control transatlantic networks versus operating as nodes within broader multinational syndicates; legal and human-rights disputes over recent strikes underscore gaps in public evidence and differing narratives between enforcement agencies and critics, meaning that operational facts about methods are robust while claims about culpability, scale, or justifications for lethal interdictions are often contested [5] [6].