What differences exist between Venezuelan groups’ cooperation with Mexican cartels versus direct partnerships with Colombian producers?
Executive summary
Venezuelan groups act as both facilitators for Mexican cartels and as direct partners with Colombian producers, but the relationships differ: Mexican cartels (Sinaloa, CJNG) are described as transnational trafficking and distribution networks that use Venezuela as a transit and operational hub [1] [2], whereas Colombian actors (FARC dissidents, ELN and other producers) are the primary source of cocaine flowing through Venezuela toward international markets and are cited as collaborators or originators of supply [3] [4]. U.S. officials and multiple outlets portray Venezuelan state-linked networks as a permissive or complicit environment that enables both types of relationships, but experts dispute how centrally coordinated that state role is [5] [6] [7].
1. Different ends: Mexican cartels as distributors, Colombians as producers
Reporting and official designations emphasize that Mexican cartels are dominant distribution and production hubs for fentanyl and downstream trafficking, while Colombian groups remain the main producers of cocaine whose product transits Venezuela en route to other markets [1] [8] [9]. That division of labour means Venezuelan actors often interact with Mexicans on movement, maritime routes and logistics, but with Colombians on sourcing and coca-to-cocaine pipelines [8] [4].
2. Transactional facilitation versus supply-chain partnerships
Multiple sources describe Venezuelan officials and networks providing permissive territory, security or facilitation—allowing Mexican and Colombian actors to operate—rather than a single, unified cartel command [5] [6] [7]. U.S. statements frame Venezuelan actors as partners in trafficking operations that move Colombian cocaine and link it to Mexican distribution networks overseas [4]. Some analysts, however, argue Venezuela’s involvement is fragmented corruption among officials rather than a tightly run cartel under Maduro [6] [7].
3. State complicity and the Cartel de los Soles debate
U.S. authorities have moved to label Venezuela-linked networks (Cartel de los Soles) as implicated in transnational trafficking and even terrorism-designations; these claims portray Venezuelan state actors as an organizing force tied directly to drug flows from Colombia and connections to Mexican cartels [10] [4]. Other observers and think tanks say the “Cartel de los Soles” is a journalistic shorthand for diffuse corruption in the military, not necessarily a single centralized cartel directed by the presidency [6] [7].
4. Operational differences on the ground: routes and tactics
Reports note a tactical shift: maritime and air routes in the Caribbean and the Venezuelan coast are used to move product toward Mexico and beyond, with U.S. naval operations targeting boats linked to these flows—efforts aimed at interdiction of routes used by Mexican-linked distribution but fed by Colombian production [2] [8]. Venezuelan groups’ cooperation with Mexican cartels therefore often focuses on logistics for long-distance shipment; cooperation with Colombian producers can involve protection, transit corridors and local processing [8] [4].
5. Political and strategic incentives differ
Mexican cartels seek secure transit corridors and distribution partnerships; Venezuelan actors can profit by renting maritime, air or land capacity and offering protection—a low-risk/high-reward commercial arrangement [1] [2]. Colombian producers, by contrast, may form deeper operational ties on Venezuelan soil—leveraging local security complicity or paramilitary links to move raw product—so Venezuelan relationships with Colombian groups may look more like supply-chain alliances [3] [4].
6. U.S. policy and intelligence shape the narrative
U.S. designations, strikes and public claims emphasize Venezuelan government complicity and highlight Mexican and Colombian roles in the overall network; those actions frame Venezuela as both a transit hub for Colombian cocaine and a theater where Mexican cartels project distribution power [10] [11]. Critics warn that military or punitive actions focused on Venezuela risk missing the larger structural networks in Mexico and Colombia that produce and distribute most drugs [8].
7. What sources do not settle
Available sources do not mention specific transactional terms, profit splits, or detailed organizational charts showing whether Venezuelan groups operate under long-term contracts with Mexican cartels versus episodic, ad hoc agreements with Colombian producers; they also do not provide indisputable proof that Venezuela’s highest political leadership centrally commands a cartel-like enterprise rather than enabling corrupt networks [6] [7].
Conclusion: The available reporting draws a clear functional distinction—Mexican cartels as distributors relying on Venezuelan logistics and Colombian groups as the primary producers whose product transits Venezuela—but it also records sharp disagreement about the degree of centralized Venezuelan state control versus diffuse corruption. Those disagreements matter for policy: treating Venezuela as a monolithic cartel target differs from treating it as a permissive environment that multiple criminal actors exploit [6] [8] [7].