What does Ketubot 11b say in full, and how have classic commentators (Rashi, Tosafot, Rambam) interpreted it?
Executive summary
The Talmudic page Ketubot 11b continues a legal discussion about the ketubah (marriage contract), focusing on special cases — converts, captives, and maidservants — and how age, prior status, and claims of virginity affect the wife's financial rights and the husband's remedies [1] [2]. Classic medieval and tosafist commentators parse the daf sharply: Rashi emphasizes contextual and narrative clarifications, Tosafot interrogate the mishnaic assumptions and liability details, and Rambam codifies practical halakhah often stressing moral and punitive consequences for sexual crimes [3] [4] [5].
1. What the daf actually covers: special cases and presumptions
Ketubot 11b treats a cluster of mishnaic rulings that set ketubah amounts and virginity presumptions for women who were redeemees or converted before age three, and then extends into cases like sexual relations with minors and the implications for claims and remedies; the basic mishnaic rule stated is that a convert, captive, or maidservant redeemed or converted under three years old has a ketubah of 200 zuz and “a claim of virginity” [1] [6]. The Gemara on this daf also addresses exceptional legal presuppositions — for instance, that once a woman was married her status regarding virginity claims changes and a subsequent husband cannot always claim virginity damages [7] [2].
2. The difficult headline: age three and liability for intercourse
A striking and often-cited passage records an assertion by Rava — taken as a reading of the mishna — that sexual intercourse with a girl under three years old is treated as having "done nothing," meaning that in the formal halakhic reckoning the act does not create the same sexual-status consequences as with older females [8]. Contemporary explanatory sources stress that this is embedded in a larger legal framework that distinguishes criminal liability, compensatory obligations, and evidentiary presumptions; modern summaries stress that Jewish law separately treats rape and non-marital sex as grave violations attracting punishment and damages [9] [5].
3. Rashi: contextualizing terms and practical scenarios
Rashi is cited across discussions of Ketubot 11 to clarify who the mishna means — for example, explicating that certain conversion cases involve children brought without a father so that the court must decide, and he helps read the daf’s terse language into real-life family situations [3]. Rashi’s role on this daf is therefore largely explanatory: he explains narrative gaps, identifies which hypothetical is under discussion, and thereby narrows ambiguities about when a claim of virginity or the reduced ketubah applies [3].
4. Tosafot: technical challenges and competing readings
Tosafot scrutinize the daf’s assumptions and present alternative legal constructions, asking when a woman is entitled to a minor ketubah or a full one and whether prior knowledge by the husband changes remedies; one Tosafot gloss explicitly contrasts rabbinic positions about whether a husband who knew his wife was a “mukkat etz” (physically scarred) is still entitled to the standard measure or not [4]. In short, Tosafot turn the daf into a forum of hypothesis testing, exposing contradictions and resolving them by refining definitions of knowledge, consent, and status [4].
5. Rambam: codification and moral framing
The Rambam is invoked by later readers (and modern summaries) as a decisive codifier who embeds the daf’s distinctions into halakhic law and who elsewhere emphasizes that non-marital sexual relations and sexual assault carry severe sanctions; summaries note that Rambam’s Mishneh Torah treats ravishment and sexual assault as punishable with lashes and monetary damages, reflecting how the Talmudic debates were translated into practical penalties [5]. Where the daf leaves open evidentiary or conceptual lacunae (for example, the exact force of the “under three” distinction), Rambam’s legal codification provides the operational law applied by later courts [5].
6. Limits of the sources and the modern conversation
Available online renderings and modern summaries capture major lines of argument on Ketubot 11b but do not reproduce a single authoritative “full text plus classical commentaries in one place” within the provided sources; translations and paraphrases differ slightly and later commentators (Tosafot, Rambam, Rashi) reframe terse talmudic formulations into either strict legal rules or contextual clarifications, and modern expositors highlight the ethical and punitive dimensions [7] [4] [5]. Where sources here summarize rather than present the complete critical apparatus, readers should consult full editions with Rashi, Tosafot, and Rambam texts for line-by-line cross-checking [2] [10].