Does the U.S. import uranium from Russia in 2025 and in what amounts?
Executive summary
U.S. law enacted in 2024 bars routine imports of Russian uranium but allows waivers through Jan. 1, 2028, and companies have obtained licenses to receive Russian low‑enriched uranium in 2024–2025 [1] [2] [3]. Multiple reporting outlets and industry statements show that shipments of Russian low‑enriched uranium reached U.S. ports in 2025 (including a reported 100‑ton delivery to Baltimore), and authorities and Rosatom officials say trade continued despite mutual bans [3] [4] [5] [6].
1. Legal backdrop: a ban with carve‑outs and waivers
Congress and the Biden administration passed prohibitions on Russian uranium imports that took effect in mid/late 2024, but the law explicitly permits companies to apply for and receive exemptions through January 1, 2028, creating a legal channel for limited purchases while domestic capacity is built [1] [2] [6]. Industry and government procurement efforts (including a DOE push to spur domestic enrichment capacity) accompany the ban, showing policy intent to reduce dependence while recognizing near‑term supply constraints [2] [7].
2. What happened in 2025: documented shipments and licensed imports
Reporting based on procurement tracking services and company disclosures documents deliveries of Russian low‑enriched uranium into the United States in 2025 — for example, ImportGenius‑sourced accounts that the vessel Atlantic Navigator II delivered about 100 tons to Baltimore on Feb. 12, 2025 — and U.S. buyers such as Centrus obtained government licenses for 2024 and 2025 deliveries [3] [4]. Analytical pieces and monitoring groups also concluded that the U.S. continued to import Russian low‑enriched uranium in 2025 despite formal restrictions [5] [6].
3. Moscow’s reciprocal measures and practical exemptions
After Washington moved to restrict imports, Moscow announced export limits in November 2024 but set up a licensing mechanism that allowed exemptions for shipments to the U.S.; Russian authorities reportedly issued or considered one‑off licenses so contracted deliveries could go ahead [1] [6]. Polish and U.S. analysts note that mutual political statements did not entirely halt commercial flows when exemptions and commercial contracts were in place [5] [6].
4. How much Russian uranium supplies U.S. demand — and the data limits
Sources indicate Russian suppliers historically supplied a significant share of enrichment services to the U.S. market and that Russian product accounted for a material portion of U.S. imports in recent years, but precise 2025 tonnage totals or dollar values vary by report and are not consistently published in the public sources provided here [2] [3] [8]. Specific reported figures include the single shipment of about 100 tons cited above, while trade‑value reporting for 2025 notes uranium among commodities driving increased U.S. import totals — for example, a reported $596 million figure for uranium in Jan–May 2025 in one compilation — but comprehensive, government‑verified 2025 quantity totals are not present in the supplied material [9] [10]. Available sources do not mention an authoritative, aggregate 2025 public figure for total U.S. imports from Russia across the whole year.
5. Competing narratives: national security vs. supply reality
U.S. policymakers frame the ban as a national‑security and geopolitical move to reduce dependency on Russian enrichment services and spur domestic capacity [2] [7]. Industry purchasers and some analysts say pragmatic exemptions were necessary to avoid shortfalls in fuel for reactors, and Russian and pro‑Russian outlets emphasize that trade continued despite the ban — an argument Moscow advances to show leverage and stability of Rosatom contracts [3] [6] [4]. These competing framings reflect an implicit agenda: U.S. leaders emphasize diversification and resilience, while Russian sources highlight continued commercial ties to argue the embargo is ineffective.
6. What reporters and monitors say about enforcement and transparency
Think tanks and monitoring organizations observe that the law’s waiver mechanism and Russia’s export‑licensing system create opaque pathways that can preserve flows even under a formal embargo; investigators have tracked individual shipments and licensing disclosures to document this reality [1] [3] [5]. Journalists note that public reporting is patchy — company annual reports, import‑tracking services, and Rosatom statements are the primary windows into flows, not a single transparent government dataset [3] [6].
7. Bottom line and limits of the record
Based on available reporting, the United States did import Russian low‑enriched uranium in 2025 under exemptions or licenses despite a statutory ban that allows waivers through 2028; documented shipments and company licensing support that conclusion [1] [3] [6]. However, a complete, government‑published tally of total 2025 tonnage or dollar amount of Russian uranium imported into the U.S. is not provided in the sources at hand, and estimates in the media vary; available sources do not mention a single authoritative aggregate 2025 figure [9] [10] [5].
If you want, I can pull together a timeline of known licensed shipments and public company disclosures from 2024–2025 in these same sources to show the documented flows month‑by‑month.