France, Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands paid Russia €34.3B for gas, while giving €21.2B in aid to Ukraine
Executive summary
France, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands remain among EU countries buying Russian gas even as Brussels ramps up aid to Kyiv: multiple trackers and reports show the EU could still pay roughly €21 billion to Russia for gas over a 12‑month horizon (Bruegel/CREA analysis) while EU institutions and member states have provided tens of billions in support to Ukraine (EU figures show €43.3bn in macro‑financial assistance 2022–2025 and wider EU aid packages) [1] [2]. Public reporting also emphasises that Russian gas accounted for roughly 12–13% of EU gas imports in 2025, with France and Belgium among the countries still receiving supplies [3] [4].
1. What the headline numbers mean: payments vs. aid
A claim that four EU countries “paid Russia €34.3B for gas, while giving €21.2B in aid to Ukraine” bundles two different categories: market purchases of Russian fossil fuels and public/government financial or military assistance to Ukraine. Bruegel’s mid‑2025 modelling estimates the EU as a whole could pay about €21 billion to Russia for gas in the next 12 months (with high‑end scenarios much larger), not a country‑by‑country settled figure; CREA’s Russia Fossil Tracker and others provide country‑level flows but the cited €34.3bn figure for those four states is not found in the supplied sources [1] [5]. Available sources do not mention a precise €34.3bn tally for France, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands specifically.
2. Sources and methodology: why numbers diverge
Estimates vary because trackers use trade data, prices, pipeline vs LNG splits, and modelling for future scenarios. Bruegel aggregates flows and scenarios to project €21bn for gas across the EU in the next year; CREA’s Russia Fossil Tracker compiles real payments since Feb 2022 but its web excerpts here do not list the exact €34.3bn breakdown quoted in the prompt [1] [5]. Journalists and think‑tanks often produce different totals depending on cut‑offs, whether they count gross imports, invoiced amounts, or converted exchange rates; the supplied sources explicitly note such methodological drivers [1].
3. The EU’s bigger picture on energy payments to Russia
Multiple EU and research outputs show the continent still sends substantial sums to Moscow for fossil fuels despite sanctions on oil and products: pipeline gas and LNG were unsanctioned and in 2025 still made up about 12–13% of EU gas imports, worth “over €15 billion annually” in some EU statements [4] [6]. Bruegel’s analysis warns the next 12 months could see €21–55bn in EU gas payments under different scenarios, highlighting exposure even as imports fall from pre‑2022 levels [1].
4. The aid side: how much Europe is sending to Ukraine
EU institutional accounting shows large and growing support. The Consilium reports €43.3bn in EU macro‑financial assistance from 2022–2025, and the EU’s Ukraine Facility and G7 mechanisms channel further grants and loans; the Commission and member states together report nearly €197bn since 2022 when counting financial, military, humanitarian and refugee assistance [2] [7]. National contributions tracked by the Kiel Institute and EU think‑tanks put total European military and financial support in the tens of billions beyond the EU budget numbers, with various updates through mid‑2025 showing large procurement and loan initiatives [8] [9].
5. Competing narratives and political framing
Advocates for tougher energy measures argue that continuing purchases finance Russia’s war and that sanctions should extend to gas; Ember, CREA and EU campaigners make that linkage and call for policy fixes like price caps or bans [10] [11]. EU policymakers, while moving to a legal ban on pipeline gas and LNG by 2027, argue transition periods and energy security constraints justify staggered cut‑offs and diversification plans [4] [3]. The EU’s legislative deadlines and exemptions reflect a political trade‑off between cutting Russian revenues and avoiding immediate energy shortages or economic shock [4] [12].
6. What’s missing or uncertain in current reporting
The precise figure in the user’s query — France, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands together paying €34.3bn for Russian gas while providing €21.2bn in aid — is not corroborated in the provided sources. CREA, Bruegel and the Russia Fossil Tracker provide broader EU totals and country rankings (e.g., France, Belgium and Spain appear among major LNG/pipeline buyers in some analyses) but the exact bilateral tallies and the €21.2bn aid number for those four countries combined are not present in these excerpts [1] [5] [2]. Available sources do not mention the exact paired comparison as quoted.
7. Takeaway: numbers need careful unpacking
Reported comparisons between energy payments and aid are politically potent but analytically delicate: payments for fossil fuels are largely private commercial transactions and vary with prices and contract types, while “aid” can mean grants, loans, military equipment, or in‑kind help and is compiled differently by EU institutions and independent trackers [1] [7] [9]. Use the major trackers (CREA/Russia Fossil Tracker, Bruegel, EU/Consilium and Kiel) and check their methodologies before reporting a direct apples‑to‑apples figure [5] [1] [2] [9].