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How has Russia repaired or protected oil refineries after Ukrainian strikes this year?
Executive summary
Russia has responded to Ukrainian strikes on refineries this year by repairing damaged units, restarting idled spare units elsewhere, and relying on redundancy in the system to limit output losses to single-digit percentages (Reuters sources estimate processing fell 3–6% while about 20% of capacity was temporarily disabled) [1] [2]. Reporting and analysts disagree on durability: some outlets and think‑tanks say repairs can be rapid for primary distillation units (weeks), while others warn repeated hits, sanctions and loss of Western parts will lengthen downtimes and erode long‑term resilience [3] [4] [5].
1. How Russia has patched immediate damage: quick repairs and restarting spare units
After many drone strikes Russia has focused first on repairing primary crude‑processing units and putting idle units back into service. Reuters’ industry sources say refineries were running below full capacity before the attacks and companies mitigated damage by restarting spare modules at both damaged and undamaged plants and by repairing and returning attacked units to service, which helped keep annual processing down only a few percent [1] [2]. Specific incidents support that pattern: the Volgograd refinery reportedly resumed full operations within about two weeks after mid‑August strikes (restored by Aug. 25 in some reports) and other plants returned key CDUs to operation after repairs [6] [3] [7].
2. The numbers: capacity hit vs. output preserved
There is a recurring distinction in reporting between “capacity” (nameplate ability) and actual “output.” Analysts and Reuters sources say Ukrainian strikes temporarily disabled as much as roughly 20–38% of passport refining capacity on paper, but measured processing volume fell only about 3–6% because spare capacity and rapid patching compensated for losses [3] [2] [1]. Reuters calculated oil processing fell by only around 3% year‑to‑date even after a wave of attacks, underscoring how redundancy and idled equipment helped blunt the strike campaign [1].
3. What kinds of repairs are said to be faster — and which are harder
Multiple accounts note primary atmospheric distillation units (CDUs or AVTs) are relatively simple and amenable to fast patch repairs — sometimes weeks — allowing rapid partial restoration [7] [8] [9]. By contrast, secondary/complex units such as FCCs, cokers and other conversion units are more technologically demanding; one example cites a six‑month repair of an FCC after a technical failure, illustrating that sophisticated equipment can take much longer to fix [5]. Foreign sanctions that curtail access to specialized parts and vendor expertise further complicate repairs to complex units [5] [10].
4. Sanctions and supply chains: a hidden drag on repair speed
Several analyses and industry reports warn that Western sanctions and the withdrawal of technology suppliers make some repairs slower, costlier and riskier. S&P Global and other outlets note U.S./EU export controls have reduced access to specialized components and know‑how, extending downtime for certain units and increasing reliance on alternative suppliers [5] [10]. EuromaidanPress and other outlets argue that the stoppage of supplies from major vendors raises the chance that routine breakdowns will become protracted crises [10].
5. Strategic trade‑offs inside Moscow: defend, repair or reroute production
Commentators say Russia has choices and trade‑offs: prioritize defending refineries, divert equipment to repairs, compensate domestic shortages with imports, or shift crude exports and processing priorities. Foreign Affairs and others argue repeated strikes force Moscow into costly decisions and that while the system has redundancy today, cumulative erosion from repeated heating/cooling cycles and deferred maintenance could degrade resilience over time [4] [5]. Reuters reporting notes Transneft and industry warnings that continued damage to ports and refineries could ultimately force cuts in crude output [11].
6. What remains disputed or missing in the public record
Open questions remain: Russia ceased publishing detailed refining data, making independent verification harder [1]. Estimates of “percent knocked out” vary widely depending on whether analysts cite nameplate capacity or live throughput; Carnegie and The Moscow Times highlight how that choice shapes headlines [3] [12]. Available sources do not mention comprehensive, centrally published repair timetables from Russia’s Energy Ministry, and the balance between planned and unplanned maintenance in 2025 is not publicly disclosed [1].
7. Bottom line and likely near‑term trajectory
Current reporting shows Russia has limited the immediate economic effect of the strikes by repairing primary units and using spare capacity, keeping aggregate processing declines relatively small so far [1] [2]. However, analysts warn sanctions, repeated attacks, and loss of Western supplier support increase the risk that future strikes inflict longer downtimes and cumulative damage, so sustainment of Ukrainian operations and supply‑chain pressure will determine whether resilience holds or degrades [4] [5].