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What impact have Ukraine strikes had on Russia's domestic fuel prices, exports, and refining capacity in 2025?
Executive summary
Ukraine’s 2025 strikes on Russian refineries have coincided with clear domestic price pressure, intermittent export disruption and measurable hits to refining capacity — but the scale and permanence of damage are contested. Multiple outlets say many refineries were hit (about 21 of 38 through parts of 2025) and that on peak days 17–20% of capacity was offline (Reuters/analysis), while reported gasoline price rises vary from mid‑double digits in some regional reports to “over 10%” nationally by October (BBC, Reuters, Chatham House) [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. “Refineries under fire — how much capacity was actually taken offline?”
Reporting shows a range of estimates: BBC and other trackers counted attacks on roughly 21 of Russia’s 38 large refineries through parts of 2025 [1] [5]. Reuters and several industry sources calculated that attacks plus maintenance took roughly 20% of Russia’s refining capacity offline at the height of the August–October wave; other estimates put the disrupted share as high as ~38% of specific measured units on paper but note idle capacity and seasonality make headline percentages misleading [6] [2] [7]. Independent analysts (Carnegie, The Moscow Times) warn “on‑paper” capacity of attacked plants can overstate permanent losses because Russia rarely runs at full nameplate capacity and can redeploy spare units [7] [8]. Reuters and follow‑up reporting say net processing volumes fell modestly in annual terms — roughly 3–6% year‑to‑date — as spare capacity and repairs mitigated the worst of the outages [2] [9].
2. “Why capacity numbers diverge — spare units, maintenance and politics”
Experts and industry sources repeatedly stress that Russia normally maintains large amounts of unused refining capacity, so a loss of particular units does not translate 1:1 into national fuel output declines [7] [2]. Reuters and Meduza report refineries leveraged idle units and rapid repairs to blunt damage, limiting overall processing declines despite pockets of severe local disruption [2] [10]. Conversely, analysts and think‑tanks (Carnegie, Atlantic Council) and some Ukrainian and Western sources argue continuing strikes, sanctions and spare‑parts constraints pose a growing long‑term risk if attacks persist into 2026 [7] [10].
3. “Domestic fuel prices and shortages — pockets vs. national trend”
Multiple outlets document real consumer pain: verified videos of queues and regional shortages appeared in August–September, and Bloomberg, BBC and other reporting link strikes to price spikes and rationing in parts of Russia [1] [11] [12]. Regional reporting cited jumps of 50%+ year‑on‑year in bulk gasoline ton prices in some markets, and Chatham House and Moscow Times cite national petrol rises “over 10%” by October [13] [4] [2]. At the same time, Reuters quotes Kremlin and industry sources saying the domestic market is “fully supplied” overall while acknowledging localized shortfalls and independent stations being most affected [6] [1].
4. “Exports: declines, bans and shifting trade patterns”
Russia moved to restrict gasoline exports and later partially ban diesel resales to protect domestic supply after the strikes, a policy response widely reported [14] [15]. Data and reporting show seaborne oil‑product loadings were broadly steady month‑to‑month in some ports even as other routes tightened, and Bloomberg/Reuters flagged that fuel shipments in mid‑November fell to the lowest since the invasion began — signalling export pressure beyond domestic measures [16] [17]. Analysts emphasise sanctions, price caps and changing buyers (shift toward Asia) also weigh on export revenues; CREA and EIA analyses show export revenues and flows declined year‑on‑year in 2025 alongside these factors [18] [19].
5. “Competing narratives and key uncertainties”
Kyiv and some analysts claim large, decisive hits (Zelensky cited up to 20–27% cuts to refining/fuel output), while Reuters, Carnegie and industry sources temper those figures by pointing to Russia’s spare capacity, rapid repairs and modest aggregate falls in processing so far [20] [2] [7]. Discrepancies stem from whether reporting counts nameplate capacity of attacked refineries, temporary outages during peak strike windows, or longer‑term lost production — and from limited official Russian transparency on refining data [7] [2]. Available sources do not mention long‑term irreversible collapse of the refining system, but several warn that sustained attacks plus sanctions could erode resilience over 2026 [10] [2].
6. “Bottom line for policymakers and markets”
Short term: strikes produced real, regionally acute shortages and pushed prices higher, prompting export curbs and emergency measures [1] [14] [6]. Medium term: Reuters and industry data show Russia has so far managed to limit total output declines to single‑digit percentages by using spare capacity, but continued attacks and sanctions increase the risk of larger, more persistent disruptions to both domestic supply and export revenues [2] [17] [18]. Sources disagree on magnitude and permanence; tracking refinery runs, export loadings and regional pump prices remains the best near‑term monitor [6] [16].