China bulids 2 cole power plantsa year
Executive summary
The statement that “China builds 2 coal power plants a year” is false when measured against available reporting: China’s coal-power activity in recent years has been in the tens of gigawatts annually, equivalent to many more than two plants, and construction starts surged to record levels in 2024 and 2025 [1] [2]. That said, comparisons are complicated by differing metrics—plants versus gigawatts, permitted versus started versus commissioned—and by policy shifts that constrain how new plants are expected to operate [3] [4].
1. What the simple claim misses: plants vs capacity
Saying “two plants a year” treats every coal plant as a single, uniform unit, while most reporting counts capacity in gigawatts (GW); China started construction on about 94.5 GW of coal-fired power in 2024, a volume that far exceeds what “two plants” could represent [1]. Databases and researchers also report hundreds or thousands of operational units—Statista counted 1,161 operational coal plants on the Chinese mainland as of mid-2024—so per-plant accounting is inconsistent across sources and over time [5].
2. Recent scale: construction and permitting have been large, not tiny
Independent trackers and researchers reported a 2024–2025 boom: construction starts and commissioning reached decade highs (94.5 GW started in 2024; large commissioning in 2025), and H1 2025 alone saw construction starts and restarts of roughly 46 GW, the equivalent of an entire country’s fleet [1] [2]. Earlier analyses noted that provinces were permitting coal capacity at a rapid clip—CREA documented a period when China was permitting roughly two new coal plants per week in 2022—so the pace is orders of magnitude above “two per year” [6].
3. The metric that matters: gigawatts, utilisation and role
Researchers emphasize that capacity additions are one thing; how much the plants run is another. China’s average coal-plant utilisation has been declining even as new capacity is added, meaning newly built plants may operate as backup or “peaker” plants rather than baseload sources [7] [4]. Some official guidance now requires new units to be more efficient and able to operate flexibly, including directives that some new stations run less than 20% of the time [4].
4. Why provinces and planners keep building despite climate pledges
Multiple explanations appear in reporting and expert analysis: energy security concerns, local economic incentives, and the speed and low cost of building coal capacity have prompted provinces to approve and start coal projects even as renewables expand; researchers warn that powerful coal interests and long-term contracts help keep plants online and profitable [3] [8] [9]. Some analysts also see a political calculus: China has pledged to “strictly limit” coal growth in 2021–2026, yet local decisions and grid stability worries have driven approvals and construction [3].
5. Policy signals and future trajectory: cooling or continued activity?
There are mixed signs. Some datasets show a fall in new proposals to ~68.9 GW in 2024, which analysts interpret as potential cooling in project initiation [3]. Beijing’s guidelines allow new coal through at least 2027 but with tighter emissions, lower utilisation targets and an expressed intention to use coal more as flexible backup for variable renewables [4] [10]. Independent forecasts stress that previously permitted projects will still drive commissioning into 2026–2027 unless policy action halts them [2].
6. Bottom line and caveats for the claim
The headline claim understates reality: China has been adding coal capacity at a rate that translates to many more than two plants annually when measured by GW or construction starts, with 94.5 GW started in 2024 and sustained high activity into 2025 [1] [2]. However, whether those plants will operate heavily or mainly serve as low‑utilisation backup—plus recent signals of slowing proposals and new operational constraints—complicates any simple tally [3] [4]. Reporting limitations include inconsistent definitions of “a plant,” uneven public disclosure across provinces, and the gap between permits, starts and commercial operation [11] [7].