Which banks and advisers refused to join the 1995 Maxwell major settlement and what were the outcomes of subsequent lawsuits against them?
Executive summary
A subset of the banks and advisers who had financed or advised Robert Maxwell did participate in the major 1995 settlement that helped recover most of the pension shortfall, while at least one major lender—Barclays—resisted that coordinated approach and pursued litigation instead; the resistance produced protracted cross-border proceedings, some jurisdictional defeats, and separate recoveries or settlements for creditors and pension trustees [1] [2] [3]. Official inquiries later faulted the big-name advisers for failing to investigate Maxwell’s affairs even when warning signs existed, and most of the missing pension money was recovered through settlements with advisers and financiers rather than by criminal convictions [4] [5] [1].
1. Who accepted the 1995 global settlement and who did not
By the mid‑1990s, a package of recoveries and settlements had been negotiated with many of the prominent advisers and banks that had dealt with Maxwell: auditors and investment houses including Coopers & Lybrand, Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs are explicitly named among those that participated in settlement and recovery efforts [1] [5]. Contemporary accounts and later analyses show that several major accounting firms entered global settlements in the early‑to‑mid‑1990s—KPMG, Deloitte and Arthur Andersen among them in related failed‑institution contexts—which helped set expectations for a broad compromise with third‑party advisers [6]. At least one major bank, Barclays, resisted being folded into the U.S.‑led recovery effort and instead fought jurisdictional and preference claims in court, seeking English injunctive relief to block U.S. proceedings [2] [7]. Sources do not provide a complete roll call of every firm that refused the deal, but they identify Barclays as a high‑profile litigant and show that many advisers ultimately paid or settled [2] [1].
2. Barclays: litigation, injunction, and jurisdictional defeats
Barclays sought an ex parte injunction in England to restrain Joint Administrators from bringing a U.S. preference action to recover transfers, and initially obtained that temporary relief; the English court later vacated the restraint and held the U.S. bankruptcy judge was the proper person to decide whether to accept jurisdiction of the recovery suit, setting the stage for transatlantic litigation rather than a unitary global settlement [2]. The dispute over jurisdiction and the proper forum consumed court resources and exemplified how one bank’s refusal to be corralled into a negotiated package produced substantive litigation: the U.S. courts proceeded with adversary complaints seeking to recover transfers to Barclays even after the English injunction was vacated [2]. The net practical outcome in the recorded sources is that Barclays’ bid to stay U.S. proceedings failed in England and the U.S. process moved forward—an outcome that undermined the bank’s attempt to avoid U.S. recovery claims [2].
3. Settlements, recoveries and what creditors actually received
The post‑Maxwell recoveries assembled a patchwork of settlements: government intermediaries and trustees recovered the bulk of the missing pension funds through a mix of out‑of‑court settlements with Maxwell companies and their auditors/advisers, and a government payout; contemporary reporting says nearly all but roughly $50 million of the £670 million missing from Maxwell pension funds was recovered, largely through settlements with firms such as Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and Coopers & Lybrand [1] [3]. One detailed tally cited by pension trustees and investigators concluded that of about £440 million initially identified as missing, roughly £276 million came from out‑of‑court settlements and the government provided a further £100 million—figures that reflect settlements rather than full judicial victories against every reluctant lender or adviser [3].
4. The reputational and regulatory aftermath for advisers and banks
Official inquiries and the DTI report were damning in tone: they criticized advisers and investment houses for treating investigation as beyond their remit and for enabling Maxwell by conferring legitimacy through their reputations, a criticism levelled at major players including Coopers & Lybrand and the investment houses that had advised Maxwell [4] [5]. While criminal prosecutions of Maxwell family members and associates were limited and acquittals occurred in some instances, the civil and administrative fallout produced large financial recoveries and a lasting reputational hit for advisers implicated in the collapse—outcomes achieved mainly by negotiated settlements and multi‑jurisdictional litigation rather than by single, decisive courtroom rulings against every resisting bank [1] [4].