How does Canada’s net government debt compare to each individual G7 country in 2024 using IMF data?
Executive summary
Canada’s general‑government net debt was the lowest in the G7 in 2024, with IMF‑based estimates cited by the Canadian government putting net debt at roughly 11.9–14.4% of GDP depending on the product and timing of the release [1] [2]. By contrast, the IMF’s reported G7 average net debt level sits dramatically higher—around the low‑to‑mid‑90s percent of GDP—illustrating a very large gap between Canada and the rest of the club on the net‑debt metric [1] [3].
1. Canada’s standing: shortest of the G7 on net debt
Multiple official Canadian publications and IMF‑based summaries report Canada as having the lowest general‑government net debt ratio in the G7 for 2024, with figures cited at 11.9% (Canada’s Annual Financial Report referencing IMF data) and other departmental presentations using a 14.4% IMF projection for 2024 depending on methodological scope [1] [2]. Independent reporting echoes that IMF placement: Reuters noted the IMF’s conclusion that Canada’s general‑government net debt is “the lowest by far among the G7 countries” while flagging that gross debt paints a very different picture [4].
2. The numerical gulf: Canada versus G7 peers and the group average
The IMF‑based aggregate numbers make the contrast stark: Canada’s net‑debt ratio sits in the low teens of GDP while IMF summaries show a G7 average net debt that is roughly in the 90s percent of GDP—variously reported in government materials as about 92.9% or similar group averages for 2023–24—meaning Canada’s net burden is a fraction of the G7 mean [1] [3]. Some departmental slides even compute the G7 average excluding Canada at about 103.8% to emphasize the divergence in 2024 projections [2]. Those averages imply that every other G7 member carries materially higher net government debt than Canada on the IMF’s net‑debt definition [1] [2].
3. Why the gap exists: pension assets, accounting definitions and IMF methodology
The single largest driver of Canada’s favourable net‑debt position in the IMF database is the treatment of large public pension‑related financial assets—chiefly Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) investments—that are subtracted from gross liabilities to produce net debt, shrinking Canada’s reported net burden by a very large sum [5] [6]. The Fraser Institute and other critics note that the difference between Canada’s gross and net debt was roughly $2.6–$2.7 trillion at the end of 2023 in IMF data, and that this accounting choice explains why net debt ranks are so favourable for Canada [5] [6].
4. Counterarguments and the gross‑debt perspective
Critical voices argue that net debt understates true exposure because it nets out liquid assets that may not be usable to service general government liabilities; using gross general‑government debt, Canada’s burden rises into triple‑digit percentage territory and moves it well down the G7 ranking—various sources put Canadian gross general‑government debt over 100% of GDP [7] [4]. The Fraser Institute and other commentators therefore contend that Canada is “highly indebted” on gross measures and that net measures can be misleading if pension assets and cross‑country accounting differences are not carefully explained [8] [5].
5. Limits of the available reporting and what remains unanswered
The reporting provided establishes Canada as the lowest net‑debt G7 member under IMF definitions and quantifies the G7‑average gap, but it does not supply a complete country‑by‑country table of each G7 member’s precise 2024 IMF net‑debt ratios in the clipped excerpts available here; therefore a side‑by‑side list of Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States with their 2024 IMF net‑debt percentages cannot be produced from these sources alone without consulting the IMF World Economic Outlook or the IMF Fiscal Monitor directly [1] [2]. The most honest reading of the material is that Canada is a clear outlier at the low end on IMF net‑debt metrics, but that the story flips materially when analysts prefer gross‑debt measures or adjust for definitional differences [1] [5] [4].