Fact check: What are the current US tariffs on imported goods?

1. Major claim roundup: What people are saying that matters

Multiple clear claims appear across the material: one analysis estimates an average effective US tariff of 18.0% with short‑run consumer price effects of +1.3% and long‑run +1.1%, emphasizing hits to metals, leather, and apparel ^[1]. Another set of claims from modelling finds the average effective tariff rose to 9.75% in July 2025 from roughly 2.2% in January 2025, and flags China facing an effective rate near 40% ^[2]. Additional reports note sectoral and country‑specific measures — e.g., large duties on autos and high ad‑hoc rates announced by political actors — and warnings about differentiated treatment of developing countries ^{[4] [5]}. These claims are not mutually exclusive; they reflect different methods and snapshots.

2. Aggregate numbers diverge — here’s why the math differs

Estimates of an “average tariff” depend on methodology: simple averages of statutory HTS rates, trade‑weighted averages, and effective rates that incorporate trade volumes and applied special measures all produce different results. The Budget Lab’s October 17, 2025 figure (18.0% effective) uses a particular aggregation and highlights distributional effects across sectors ^[1]. The Penn Wharton model’s 9.75% July 2025 number reflects a different weighting and timeframe and explicitly models country‑level variation with China carrying much higher effective duties ^[2]. Official Harmonized Tariff Schedule data capture statutory line‑item rates but do not by themselves show economic incidence; therefore comparisons between studies must account for weighting, scope, and whether temporary or ad‑hoc measures are included ^{[6] [7]}.

3. Product and partner story: where the tariffs bite hardest

Across the material, a consistent theme is that metals, autos, apparel, and selected agricultural and leather goods have seen the largest hikes or heaviest effective rates, and China is repeatedly identified as facing substantially higher effective duties than many other partners. Reports cite sectoral safeguards such as steel and aluminum measures and politically announced tariffs on cars and specific countries, which raise effective rates for those categories ^{[1] [4] [8]}. UNCTAD and other observers warn that differentiated tariffs — especially those that treat developing countries more harshly — represent a significant policy shift with outsized effects on vulnerable exporters ^[5]. The net outcome is a patchwork of high rates in sensitive sectors and lower barriers elsewhere.

4. Conflicting narratives, political motives, and what to watch for

The analyses reflect different agendas and emphases: university and budget‑modeling teams emphasize macroeconomic incidence and consumer price effects, investment banks discuss global spillovers without always giving granular rates, while political reporting highlights announced headline tariffs that may be symbolic or conditional ^{[1] [9] [4]}. UNCTAD frames the changes as a departure from MFN norms, signaling geopolitical and developmental implications ^[5]. The policy debate matters because headline percentages (e.g., “25% on cars” or “40% on China”) can obscure exemptions, country‑specific carve‑outs, and temporary measures; official HTS revisions and USITC proceedings determine final applied duties ^{[3] [7]}.

5. Bottom line and where to get authoritative, up‑to‑date rates

There is no single number that answers “current US tariffs” — you need the Harmonized Tariff Schedule line‑items and applied measures by country and product to compute an effective rate for a specific good. The USITC’s HTS database and recent modification notices are the authoritative sources for statutory duty rates and ongoing changes; modeling studies provide useful summaries of effective and consumer‑price impacts but differ by method ^{[6] [3] [7] [2]}. For immediate decisions, consult the HTS for the specific tariff classification and review recent USITC notices; for macro context, balance the Budget Lab’s October 17, 2025 estimate and Penn Wharton’s July 2025 effective‑rate series to understand both headline measures and the granular reality ^{[1] [2] [7]}.