Which financial institutions handled Jeffrey Epstein's accounts and have been scrutinized for enabling his trafficking network?

1. JPMorgan Chase: the largest, most intensively probed relationship

JPMorgan Chase is central to the follow‑the‑money story: investigators and senators say the bank opened dozens of accounts for Epstein, reportedly processed over $1 billion in transactions and operated as his primary U.S. banking relationship for years—allegations that have prompted Senate and House inquiries into executive‑level decisions and alleged compliance failures ^{[7] [8] [9]}. Senator Ron Wyden and other congressional figures contend compliance officers repeatedly raised red flags that were overridden, and Wyden’s ongoing analysis accuses top JPMC executives of protecting Epstein through a pattern of failures spanning nearly two decades ^{[8] [9]}. Congressional requests and proposed legislation aim to force Treasury to disclose Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) that would show which banks filed what and when ^[10].

2. Deutsche Bank: regulator findings and a six‑figure fine

When JPMorgan distanced itself from Epstein in 2013, Deutsche Bank is documented to have taken on his business and maintained it for several years amid red flags, with New York Department of Financial Services investigators later finding “significant compliance failures” and assessing a $150 million penalty against the bank for its handling of Epstein accounts ^[2]. Reporting shows Deutsche Bank relationship managers internally minimized risks even as investigators say account activity should have triggered tougher scrutiny, and the bank’s CEO publicly called taking Epstein as a client “a critical mistake” ^[2].

3. Bank of America and BNY Mellon: delayed SARs and civil suits

Bank of America has been accused in reporting and litigation of handling hundreds of millions in Epstein‑linked funds while filing only belated SARs tied to large payments—particularly those involving Leon Black—leading to fresh scrutiny and lawsuits that allege the bank failed to meet Bank Secrecy Act obligations ^{[11] [12] [5]}. The Bank of New York Mellon has likewise been singled out for filing SARs covering hundreds of millions of dollars but only years after key transactions, and both institutions now face litigation and congressional interest that could produce more internal records ^{[11] [5]}.

4. Barclays, other banks, and the wider banking industry reckoning

Beyond the headline four, Barclays and other global institutions appear in the broader mosaic: executive ties and regulatory probes have led to resignations and inquiries—Jes Staley’s departure at Barclays being one high‑profile example—and industry case studies argue that toxic incentives and client‑revenue pressures repeatedly outweighed compliance teams’ objections ^{[4] [13]}. Compliance Week and American Banker have chronicled how compliance staff at several banks flagged risks that were nevertheless ignored because Epstein was a lucrative and connected client ^{[13] [4]}.

5. What’s proven, what’s alleged, and what remains sealed

Regulatory findings (Deutsche Bank’s NYDFS penalty), congressional analyses (Wyden and Raskin probes), and ongoing civil lawsuits establish a pattern of alleged failures to detect or timely report suspicious activity across multiple banks, but full clarity depends on records still sealed or held by Treasury—Wyden’s proposed legislation and survivor advocacy explicitly seek access to SARs and Treasury files to quantify the dollar flows and name all institutions that filed Epstein SARs ^{[2] [10] [6]}. Banks have sometimes acknowledged mistakes and paid penalties or settlements, while disputing intentional wrongdoing; at the same time, lawmakers and survivors argue that delayed or withheld SARs deprived law enforcement of opportunities to intervene ^{[2] [9] [6]}.

6. The politics and incentives around disclosure

Efforts to compel release of Epstein‑related Treasury records are politically charged: senators and survivors press for transparency and accountability while executive branch control over what is released has delayed access, and partisan posturing has at times framed the release as a political cudgel even as victims press for nonpartisan follow‑the‑money justice ^{[6] [3] [14]}. Reporting organizations—from congressional committees to Compliance Week and Fortune—have varied incentives and audiences, but together they have focused scrutiny on JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, BNY Mellon and, to a lesser degree, Barclays as the banks whose accounts and compliance practices are most implicated to date ^{[1] [2] [13]}.