Which G7 countries have the highest share of debt held domestically versus by foreign investors in 2025?

Checked on February 6, 2026
Disclaimer: Factually can make mistakes. Please verify important information or breaking news. Learn more.

Executive summary

Japan stands out in the reporting as the G7 country with the largest share of government debt held domestically—an established pattern repeatedly noted in recent analyses—while the available sources do not provide a full, source-backed ranking of every G7 government’s domestic vs. foreign creditor mix for 2025, leaving precise comparative conclusions beyond what can be reliably claimed from the provided material [1] [2].

1. Why the question matters: domestic holders change the politics and risks

Who holds a country’s debt is as important as how large the debt pile is: debt owned by domestic banks, pension funds and households changes monetary and political feedback loops, while high foreign ownership can amplify exchange‑rate and market‑liquidity risks—an analytical frame that underlies much of the coverage of G7 sovereign debt in 2024–25 [3] [1].

2. The one clear, well-documented case: Japan purchases most of its own debt

Multiple recent summaries and policy pieces emphasize that Japan “largely purchases its own debt domestically,” a structural feature driving both its sky-high debt-to-GDP ratio and the unique policy challenges Japan faces as it exits yield‑curve control and normalizes rates, making Japan the G7 country most clearly identified in the reporting as having a high domestic share of government debt [1] [4].

3. What the reporting says — and does not say — about other G7 members

The collected sources provide comprehensive coverage of debt-to-GDP levels and market pricing but do not supply a definitive 2025 table of domestic versus foreign holders for each G7 country: IMF datapages and debt projections (cited for debt levels) do not include creditor‑composition breakdowns in the snippets provided, and major news pieces focus on investor risk premia and market reactions rather than an itemized holder map [2] [5] [3].

4. Signals from market coverage that point to higher foreign holdings (but aren’t conclusive)

Reporting on bond markets and net international positions implies relatively larger foreign involvement in some G7 bond markets — for example, Reuters’ focus on market risk premia and cross‑country investor positioning suggests countries such as France, the UK and the U.S. attract substantial foreign buyers of their bonds, while a worsening U.S. net international investment position was noted in 2025 commentary [3] [6] — but these pieces stop short of providing a full, sourced percentage split for 2025.

5. Where available data and narrative disagree, and why that matters

Debt-to-GDP narratives dominate many outlets (illustrated by Visual Capitalist, Statista and IMF coverage), which can obscure holder composition; observers focused on sovereign risk and bond yields (Reuters, RSM commentary) emphasize who is buying and pricing risk without publishing the granular holder shares needed to declare a ranked domestic/foreign ownership list across the G7 for 2025 [5] [7] [3] [1].

6. Balanced conclusion and limits of the evidence

Based strictly on the provided reporting, Japan is the clearest example in 2025 of a G7 country whose debt is overwhelmingly domestically held [1]; the sources do not contain a complete, source‑cited ranking of all seven countries’ domestic vs. foreign debt shares for 2025, so any definitive list beyond identifying Japan would exceed what the assembled reporting supports [2] [3]. Alternative viewpoints exist in market reports that imply larger foreign holdings for economies with deep, liquid capital markets (U.S., U.K., France), but those implications are not quantified in the provided material [3] [6].

Want to dive deeper?
What percentage of Japanese government debt was held domestically in 2025 and how has that changed since 2010?
Which G7 bond markets had the largest foreign investor share in 2024–25, according to IMF or central bank data?
How does high foreign ownership of sovereign debt affect a country's vulnerability to sudden stops and exchange‑rate shocks?