How do CME Group warehouse reports and CFTC Bank Participation Reports work, and what do they reveal about COMEX silver concentrations?
Executive summary
CME Group publishes daily warehouse and delivery data that distinguish "registered" (deliverable) silver from "eligible" stocks and provides historical registrar reports and spreadsheets for verification [1] [2] [3]. The CFTC’s monthly Bank Participation Report gives a single aggregate snapshot of bank activity on a fixed reference date but does not name institutions, and on recent reporting dates showed banks as a cohort net short hundreds of millions of ounces — for example, 22 banks net short roughly 212 million ounces in COMEX silver futures on a December 2, 2025 snapshot [4] [5] [6].
1. How CME warehouse reports function as the exchange’s physical ledger
CME Group maintains and publishes daily delivery notices, warehouse stock listings and registrar reports that record the location, classification and quantity of silver held in COMEX-approved depositories, providing the public ledger used to determine what metal is available for contract delivery [1] [2] [3]. Those reports separate "registered" inventory — metal already deemed deliverable against futures — from "eligible" inventory, which meets quality specs but may require processing or transfer to qualify for delivery; exchange filings have even noted that the exchange discounts eligible silver when estimating deliverable supply (a 50% discount is documented in COMEX analysis) [7] [8].
2. How the CFTC Bank Participation Report (BPR) is constructed and published
The BPR is compiled from clearinghouse and exchange data as of the first Tuesday of each month (with holiday adjustments) and published on the first Friday after 3:30 p.m. ET, presenting a monthly aggregate of positions held by reporting banks across futures contracts without identifying any single bank [4]. That aggregation is intentionally designed to reveal sector-level exposure — e.g., "banks" as a group — while preserving counterparty anonymity, so the cleanest official window into bank positioning is always summary-level rather than institution-by-institution [4] [5].
3. What the official reports actually reveal about COMEX silver concentrations
Taken together, the exchange’s warehouse ledgers and the BPR offer two complementary but incomplete perspectives: the CME shows how much physical metal is present and classified for delivery on any given day (with registered amounts reported daily and eligible amounts separately) [1] [2] [3], while the BPR shows that banks as a group historically carried a material net short in COMEX silver futures — for example, the December 2, 2025 BPR indicated 22 banks net short roughly 212 million ounces — a substantial paper exposure when compared to on‑exchange registered stocks reported in late December 2025 (registered silver cited at ~127.6 million ounces on December 29, 2025 in one reporting snapshot) [5] [6].
4. Gaps, caveats and why simple tallies mislead
Neither data feed tells the whole story: CME warehouse tallies exclude off‑exchange physical holdings (London vaults, ETFs’ custodial holdings, bilateral OTC metal) and the exchange itself warns that some eligible stocks are not immediately deliverable and may be discounted when estimating actual deliverable supply [7] [1]. Likewise, the BPR is aggregate only, omitting names and netting across futures, options and OTC hedges — so reported net shorts do not reveal gross long/short mismatches, offsetting positions, or which banks (if any) underlie those totals [4] [9].
5. Popular narratives vs what official data supports
Viral claims that "eight banks are collectively short 725 million ounces" or that a single bank holds ~713 million ounces are not supported by named, public CFTC or CME figures and often stem from third‑party aggregations or social‑media reconstructions rather than direct regulator disclosure [5] [10]. Responsible cross‑checking requires matching CME daily warehouse stock reports, the CFTC BPR, and SEC/ETF custody filings; analysts who produce precise bank-level tallies routinely note these are reconstructions and explicitly recommend verifying against primary registrar and regulatory filings [10] [5].
6. Implications for market stress and what the data cannot show
Officially published warehouse inventories and the BPR together highlight potential strain points — modest registered inventories versus sizable bank net shorts can create delivery risk and prompt exchange actions (margins, rule changes) as markets move — which CME and market commentators have cited when margins or interventions occur [1] [6]. However, the records cannot prove intent, counterparty identity, or off‑exchange physical flows; any claim that the exchange is “broken” or that a named bank alone controls a dominant short position exceeds what the cited CME and CFTC disclosures will support [7] [4] [5].