How have JPMorgan, BNY Mellon and Deutsche Bank responded to congressional subpoenas for Epstein-related SARs and internal reviews?
Executive summary
JPMorgan has signaled conditional cooperation with congressional subpoenas while pointing to belated internal reviews and retroactive suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed after Jeffrey Epstein’s death [1] [2]. BNY Mellon has been portrayed as a late filer of SARs covering hundreds of millions in Epstein-linked payments and has framed recent legal setbacks as vindication of its conduct, while publicly declining or providing limited comment to some congressional queries [3] [4] [5]. Deutsche Bank, already a party to earlier settlements over Epstein-related allegations, has been ordered in at least one congressional action to produce records and has faced the same Democratic requests for documents as other large banks [6] [1].
1. JPMorgan — conditional compliance, retroactive reviews and SARs
Republican and Democratic clashes in the House set the stage for JPMorgan’s posture: Ranking Member Jamie Raskin’s letters demanded records tying the bank to more than $1.5 billion in suspicious transactions, and those letters note JPMorgan did not file SARs until after Epstein’s death and that a posthumous internal review produced thousands of delayed filings covering roughly $1.1 billion [2] [1]. JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon publicly expressed regret for any association with Epstein and has said the bank would comply with a subpoena if legally required, language Raskin leaned on in pressing for documents [1] [4]. Separate reporting also records that JPMorgan reached a significant settlement with Epstein victims in 2023, which sits behind congressional interest in the bank’s prior handling of accounts and transaction monitoring [4].
2. BNY Mellon — late SARs, litigation posture and claims of exoneration
BNY Mellon is repeatedly described in the Democrats’ outreach as having filed SARs years after Epstein’s death covering roughly $378 million in Epstein-related transfers, a delay Raskin calls statutorily problematic and consequential [1] [4]. At the same time, BNY Mellon has been sued by alleged victims and has fought those claims in court; a judge dismissed several claims against BNY Mellon and the bank characterized that outcome as reinforcing its lack of involvement in Epstein’s crimes [5] [3]. Reporting also shows that, when approached about Raskin’s letters, some banks including BNY Mellon did not reply to media inquiries — a pattern Raskin highlighted in pressing for formal congressional production rather than selective public statements [4].
3. Deutsche Bank — prior settlement and compelled production
Deutsche Bank has previously paid a settlement to Epstein victims and appears in Raskin’s outreach among the four institutions whose SARs and review materials Democrats sought [4] [1]. Later reporting indicates that JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank were ordered to hand over financial records tied to Epstein as part of at least one Congressional investigation led by the House Oversight Committee, signaling that Deutsche Bank has faced formal subpoenas or production orders in addition to Democratic letters [6]. The bank’s earlier settlement creates both legal exposure and a political imperative to produce records when Congress seeks them [4].
4. Congressional tactics, partisan dynamics and bank defenses
Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee sought subpoenas for bank records but were blocked in committee votes, prompting Raskin to send public letters requesting documentation and pressuring CEOs directly [1] [2]. Separately, House Oversight activity produced subpoena orders for at least JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank, reflecting competing committee strategies and a broader push to obtain SARs and internal reviews [6]. Banks have balanced limited public comment, legal defenses in civil suits, and conditional promises to comply with lawful subpoenas while litigating or settling related claims, an approach that protects litigation posture even as it frustrates Democratic investigators seeking fuller transparency [4] [3] [5].
5. What is still missing and why it matters
Available reporting documents demands, some court decisions, settlements, and bank statements about compliance or remorse, but public sources do not provide full text of every bank production, nor a definitive public accounting of how many SARs were produced to Congress or what internal review findings were disclosed, leaving substantive questions about timing, compliance and supervisory breakdowns unresolved [2] [6]. That gap means congressional subpoenas and court litigation remain the primary mechanisms likely to reveal whether delayed filings represented compliance failures, systemic anti-money-laundering lapses, or a mix of both — and the banks’ limited public responses reflect both legal risk management and the partisan context of the probes [1] [5].