How has the Russian ruble performed against the US dollar since the start of the Ukraine invasion?
Executive summary
Since Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 the ruble has moved from a dramatic, immediate collapse in late February–March 2022 to an unusual mid‑2022 recovery above prewar levels and then into a longer, policy‑driven weakening through 2023–2024 that left the currency trading around 90–115 rubles per US dollar depending on the moment; those swings reflect sanctions, central‑bank controls and swings in energy revenue rather than a single structural trend [1] [2] [3] [4]. Policymakers repeatedly intervened — doubling and then sharply raising interest rates, imposing capital controls and curbing FX trading — and those actions shaped the ruble’s erratic path as much as war‑related sanctions and commodity markets [2] [5] [6].
1. The initial shock: an almost instantaneous collapse in late Feb–March 2022
When war began, the ruble plunged in days, losing roughly half its value at the end of February and early March 2022 as Western sanctions, bank restrictions and the freezing of foreign reserves hit markets; by early March the ruble was trading at record lows — reports cite figures from about ₽110 to as weak as ₽135 per US dollar — prompting emergency central‑bank action [1] [2] [7] [5].
2. Emergency medicine: capital controls, rate spikes and temporary stabilization
Russia’s immediate policy response was swift: the central bank doubled and then raised benchmark interest rates to very high levels (reported at 20% in March 2022) and imposed capital controls and limits on FX operations, measures that reintroduced liquidity constraints and temporarily stabilized — and in some months even strengthened — the ruble despite sanctions [2] [5] [6].
3. The counterintuitive summer of 2022: a strengthened currency amid isolation
After the initial collapse the ruble rallied through mid‑2022 and at times traded stronger than before the invasion, a result analysts attribute to curtailed imports, rising oil prices and forced conversion of export revenues into rubles under new rules; for a period the currency traded well above prewar levels, illustrating how trade flows and capital controls can support a currency even as the economy is isolated [3] [6] [2].
4. Reversal and gradual weakening from late 2022 into 2024: fading export revenues and renewed sanctions
From late 2022 onward the temporary equilibrium frayed: export revenues fell, sanctions resumed new waves targeting banks and energy channels, and by late 2023–2024 the ruble had weakened again appreciably — on several occasions hitting levels around ₽100–110 or lower and even touching ₽114 in late 2024 according to contemporary reports — prompting further CBR interventions [3] [4] [8] [9].
5. Drivers and counter‑drivers: sanctions, oil, trade balances and political messaging
The currency’s trajectory reflects competing forces: sanctions and bank restrictions raised volatility and broke normal FX plumbing [1] [5]; commodity prices and redirected energy sales to non‑Western buyers propped up fiscal balances and, for stretches, the ruble [3] [4]; central‑bank capital controls and very high interest rates altered market mechanics and produced episodic recoveries [2] [6]; and Kremlin messaging has frequently minimized exchange‑rate significance while emphasizing benefits for exporters, signaling a political agenda to normalize depreciation when convenient [8].
6. What “performance” means: volatility, not simple decline
Answering how the ruble has “performed” exposes a story of volatility rather than monotonic decline: an acute crash in Feb–Mar 2022, an unprecedented rebound in summer 2022 that pushed rates stronger than prewar, and then a protracted weakening in 2023–24 tied to falling export earnings and fresh sanctions that at times returned USD/RUB to the 100–115 range [1] [3] [4] [7]. Different sources emphasize different moments — immediate crash [1] [2], temporary strength [3], and renewed weakening into late 2024 [4] [8] — so a full answer must account for timing and policy interventions as much as headline rates.
7. Limits of the available reporting
Public reporting documents the major inflection points but cannot fully illuminate opaque domestic FX operations, unlisted bilateral payment arrangements or the exact share of export receipts converted into rubles at any given day; where sources disagree on exact peaks or timing, the reporting still converges on the broad pattern of shock, control‑driven recovery, then renewed weakening [6] [9] [3].