Russia sold more than 70% of its gold federal reserves because of the war with Ukraine
Executive summary
Official tallies and multiple media and intelligence reports show large, sustained sales of gold from Russia’s National Wealth Fund (NWF) since 2022, with some outlets and analysts reporting reductions in the NWF’s gold holding in the range of roughly 55–71% — but those figures refer to the NWF’s stock, not necessarily every element of Russia’s total federal or central-bank gold reserves [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. What the headline numbers actually measure
Claims that “Russia sold more than 70% of its gold federal reserves” largely draw on data about the National Wealth Fund’s gold holdings, which sources say fell from roughly 405.7 metric tons before the full‑scale invasion to figures reported between ~160–173 tons by late‑2025 or January 2026 — a decline variously characterized as about 57% (to 173.1t) or as high as 71% (to 160.2t) depending on the dataset and cut‑off dates used [5] [3] [1] [4]. Those reports focus on the NWF, a sovereign stabilization vehicle, and not necessarily the entirety of Russia’s central bank gold stockpiles or the valuation of bullion holdings expressed in dollars, which have been affected by a global gold price rally [6] [7] [8].
2. Why gold has been monetized: multiple, overlapping motives
Reporting and expert analysis show Russia has monetized gold for several overlapping reasons tied to the war: to plug budget gaps created by lower oil revenues and sanctions, to inject ruble liquidity and stabilize the currency, and to finance state spending including military outlays — all motives cited across finance ministry statements, banking analysts, and intelligence outlets [1] [9] [3] [5]. VTB and other analysts warn of continued drawdowns to cover fiscal shortfalls, estimating further NWF spending and potential gold sales through 2026 [1] [9].
3. Sanctions, frozen assets and the changing composition of reserves
The decision to monetize gold is framed by the broader context that large chunks of Russia’s overseas assets were immobilized early in the war, leaving gold and Chinese yuan among the most liquid domestically‑usable buffers — a shift documented in reporting that shows liquid NWF assets declined and gold’s share in reserves rose even as foreign currency items fell [6] [2] [8]. Analysts and government statements cited by media link the sales directly to the need to substitute for lost export and frozen asset revenues [3] [4].
4. Conflicting numbers and what they reveal about interpretation risk
Different outlets and agencies report different tonnages and percentages — “over half,” “57%,” and “71%” all appear in reputable and partisan reporting streams — reflecting differences in which reserve bucket (NWF vs. broader central bank holdings), the date cutoffs, and whether valuation or physical tonnage is the metric [2] [3] [1] [4]. This variance matters: a percentage that is true for the NWF can be misread as applying to all federal or central‑bank gold unless the reader notes the data source and scope [1] [6].
5. The counterpoint: price effects and retained strategic value
Even as Moscow sells physical gold from the NWF, the dramatic global rally in gold prices has increased the dollar value of Russia’s remaining bullion holdings — a dynamic highlighted by Bloomberg‑based calculations and reporting that show substantial dollar gains in Bank of Russia gold valuations since February 2022 [7] [8]. RAND and other analysts emphasize that Russia had consciously built large gold stocks before 2022, making gold both a strategic reserve and a tool for wartime financial maneuvering rather than a single-sale emergency asset [10] [11].
6. Bottom line: the claim needs precision, not rejection
It is accurate to say that Russia has liquidated a very large portion of the National Wealth Fund’s gold since 2022 to address war‑related fiscal pressures and related economic shocks; whether that equals “more than 70% of its gold federal reserves” depends on defining “gold federal reserves” — the stronger evidence supports large percentage drops in NWF holdings (figures reported around 55–71%), while broader central‑bank holdings and dollar‑value measures tell a more complex story influenced by rising gold prices [1] [3] [2] [7]. Sources used here document the sales and motives, but do not provide a single authoritative, consolidated ledger that proves the 70% claim across every official reserve definition [1] [6].