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What were creditor recovery rates in Trump Entertainment Resorts Chapter 11 in 2004 and 2009?
Executive Summary
The available analyses show that explicit numeric creditor recovery rates for Trump Entertainment Resorts’ Chapter 11 cases in 2004 and 2009 are not spelled out in the supplied documents, but contemporaneous materials indicate materially different outcomes: the December 2004 plan laid out claim treatments without publishing a simple recovery percentage, while the 2009 restructuring left bondholders effectively with a 10% equity stake in the reorganized company as part of a settlement with Donald J. Trump, implying a substantial write-down for creditors. This review synthesizes the provided source analyses, highlights what is known and not known, and flags where the record requires primary court or trustee filings for precise recovery-rate calculations [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. What the 2004 Plan Actually Documents—and What It Omits, Loudly
The December 15, 2004 Joint Plan of Reorganization for Trump Entertainment Resorts sets out the treatment classes for secured, unsecured, and equity interests as part of the Chapter 11 process, but the document referenced in the analysis does not present a single aggregated recovery-rate figure for creditors. The plan is a legal roadmap that describes how claims are to be restructured, paid, or converted into new instruments; that structure can produce widely varying recoveries by class, and the absence of a published “percent recovered” in the provided file means one cannot state a precise recovery rate for secured or unsecured creditors without consulting detailed schedules, balloting results, or consummation orders from the bankruptcy court [1] [4]. The omission of a headline recovery percentage in the 2004 source is therefore a key limitation for anyone trying to compare 2004 to later reorganizations.
2. The 2009 Settlement: Bondholders Ended Up With 10%—Why That Matters
The 2009 outcome described in the supplied analyses indicates that bondholders and other creditors agreed to a settlement that gave Donald J. Trump 10% of the reorganized company, signaling a major writedown on existing debt claims; this structure implies creditors accepted equity in lieu of full cash recovery, which typically equates to a lower immediate recovery and a speculative equity upside. Reports summarized in the analyses state the company’s senior notes totaled roughly $1.25 billion and that collateral coverage was likely insufficient, which helps explain why creditors took an equity position instead of full repayment—their cash recovery was likely limited and contingent on post-emergence performance [2] [3]. The 10% equity allocation is a concrete datum that provides directional insight into creditor losses in 2009.
3. Divergent Interpretations and the Missing Quantitative Bridge
The supplied summaries show a tension between structural descriptions (plan documents) and press accounts that distill deals into headline terms like “10%,” but they stop short of converting those legal allocations into precise recovery percentages for every creditor class. The 2004 10-K and the 2004 plan materials provide corporate financial context, but not a reconciled post-confirmation recovery table; the 2009 press reporting captures negotiated equity splits but not final cash recoveries, trustee distributions, or subsequent dilution that would change recovery math [4] [3]. This gap—legal treatment vs. hard-dollar recoveries—is where most confusion arises; without schedules of allowed claims, distribution waterfalls, and post-emergence equity capitalization tables, exact recovery rates cannot be calculated from the supplied materials alone.
4. What To Consult Next to Produce Exact Recovery Rates
To calculate precise recovery rates for 2004 and 2009, the necessary documents are the confirmed plan’s disclosure statement, the court’s confirmation order, allowed claim registers, the distribution ledgers, and any post-confirmation dilution or exchange records—documents not included in the supplied analyses. The supplied sources point researchers to the right places: the 2004 Joint Plan and the 2004 10-K for context, and the 2009 news reports for the negotiated equity outcome; but only bankruptcy court dockets and trustee/plan administrator accountings will yield numeric recoveries by claim class [1] [4] [3]. Researchers should obtain the bankruptcy case files (docket entries) for cases filed and confirmed in 2004 and 2009 to create an itemized recovery table.
5. Bottom Line: Directional Answer with a Caveat—Large Losses by 2009, Unstated 2004 Percentages
In sum, the available analyses show that the 2004 plan exists but does not include a summarized creditor recovery percentage in the provided extract, while the 2009 deal translated into bondholders taking 10% of the reorganized equity, indicating significant creditor haircuts. The correct, precise recovery rates by class for each year remain unreported in the supplied materials and require primary bankruptcy filings and allowed-claim schedules to compute. The most reliable next step is retrieval of the bankruptcy court confirmation orders and allowed-claim registers for both the 2004 and 2009 cases to convert plan terms into definitive recovery percentages [1] [2] [3] [4].