Have they closed millions of bank accounts in Vietnamese due to people not handing over their biometric data

Checked on December 5, 2025
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Executive summary

Vietnam’s State Bank (SBV) has enforced biometric ID rules that led banks to deactivate about 86 million accounts deemed inactive or non‑compliant; the measure is tied to Project 06 and Circulars 17/18 and was implemented in stages across 2025 (deadlines ranged from Jan 1 for some functions to Sept 1/30 for broader deactivations) [1] [2] [3]. Reporting frames this as a “data‑cleansing” push to fight fraud and money‑laundering but also warns of wide financial exclusion, practical barriers for foreigners and migrants, and privacy/surveillance concerns [1] [4] [5].

1. What happened: a massive account sweep tied to new biometric rules

Multiple outlets report the SBV began restricting or deactivating tens of millions of bank accounts in 2025 after banks were ordered to link accounts to biometric identity records; the widely cited figure is roughly 86 million accounts targeted as inactive or lacking biometric updates, with enforcement steps escalating through the year and major cutoffs in September 2025 [3] [6] [1].

2. The official rationale: anti‑fraud, anti‑money‑laundering, and digital ID rollout

Vietnam’s stated aim is to eliminate anonymous or improperly identified accounts, reduce online fraud, and integrate banking with a national digital identity (Project 06). Regulators and the SBV cite fraud prevention and alignment with new electronic identification decrees requiring facial or fingerprint authentication for certain transactions [2] [1] [7].

3. The mechanics: phased deadlines, transaction limits and scope

Circulars and SBV guidance expanded biometric authentication for both individuals and corporate legal representatives, with phased deadlines (e.g., biometric checks for some services by Jan 1, 2025; corporate reps by July 1; widescale deactivations around Sept 1–30). Biometric approval was required for higher‑risk online transfers (thresholds reported in sources range from ~10 million VND to daily cumulative thresholds) and non‑compliant accounts faced suspension of online functions or full deactivation [2] [8] [7].

4. Who’s most affected: inactive accounts, foreigners, elderly and migrants

Reporting highlights that many affected accounts are “inactive” or forgotten product lines, but practical barriers hit people abroad, elderly citizens, migrants, and small business owners who cannot easily access in‑branch biometric enrollment; several articles describe foreigners forced to return to Vietnam to verify identities and difficulties for those outside the country [4] [5] [9].

5. Scale and consequences: financial exclusion vs. system integrity

Analysts quoted in coverage warn of large‑scale financial exclusion, disruptions to remittances, and hardship for small entrepreneurs; others emphasize reported fraud reductions and the SBV’s goal of a cleaner digital financial ecosystem. Some outlets quantify remittance stakes and estimate compliance rates, but exact economic impact remains being assessed in reporting [3] [4] [9].

6. Privacy, surveillance and political framing

Critics in crypto and civil‑liberties circles frame the policy as expanding “next‑gen financial surveillance” by linking identity and transactions, arguing it centralizes control over access to funds; pro‑regulatory sources counter that biometric linkage is necessary to stop AI‑driven fraud rings and laundering schemes [5] [3] [1].

7. Reporting discrepancies and limitations in the sources

Available sources broadly agree on the ~86 million figure and the connection to Project 06 and Circulars 17/18, but differ on nuance: some say accounts were “deactivated,” others that they were “closed” or “frozen”; timelines and exact transaction thresholds vary across pieces [3] [6] [7]. Sources do not uniformly document how many of the 86 million were truly “active” deposit accounts with balances vs. dormant product records—available sources do not mention a definitive breakdown of active balances affected [1] [4].

8. Alternatives and mitigation reported by officials

Authorities and industry pieces say banks offered multiple authentication options (in‑branch, digital VNeID remote routes for some overseas citizens) and pop‑up biometric stations to onboard users; yet several articles still document low compliance in parts and real‑world barriers for many customers [2] [3] [4].

9. What to watch next

Watch for SBV or bank disclosures clarifying exactly how many closed accounts held usable balances and for audits or NGO reporting on exclusion outcomes; also monitor legal challenges or policy refinements if disruption to remittances or essential services becomes politically salient [1] [3]. Sources so far present competing frames—security and modernization vs. exclusion and surveillance—so the narrative will hinge on follow‑up data from regulators and affected communities [2] [5].

Limitations: reporting is largely secondary and sometimes partisan (crypto outlets emphasize freedom arguments; industry pieces stress fraud prevention). Concrete figures on affected deposit balances and the full demographic breakdown are not provided in the cited sources—those details are not found in current reporting [1] [4] [3].

Want to dive deeper?
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