Keep Factually independent
Whether you agree or disagree with our analysis, these conversations matter for democracy. We don't take money from political groups - even a $5 donation helps us keep it that way.
Which federal agency approves emergency SNAP funding and how is it triggered?
Executive Summary
The federal agency that approves and administers emergency SNAP funding is the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), chiefly through its Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), and emergency allotments or contingency draws are triggered by distinct legal mechanisms depending on the circumstance: court orders or contingency funds during a funding lapse, and statutory emergency declarations or public-health declarations for COVID-era emergency allotments. Legal disputes in late 2025 over a government shutdown showed judges ordering the USDA to deploy contingency or emergency reserves to cover benefits, while USDA and some officials asserted limits on using contingency money absent express appropriation or when funds were not legally available [1] [2] [3]. This analysis lays out the different triggers, agency roles, and competing interpretations that produced conflicting actions and court rulings in 2025.
1. Why the USDA/FNS is the central actor — and what it actually controls
Federal law designates the USDA as the agency that runs SNAP, and the Food and Nutrition Service is the USDA component that implements benefit rules and emergency allotments; USDA/FNS approves waivers, allocates emergency allotments, and administers contingency mechanisms tied to SNAP operations. The statutory and regulatory framework gives states operational roles but leaves decisions about federal emergency authority and the use of federal contingency funds to USDA/FNS, which in practice has both procedural discretion and legal constraints on when it can obligate federal monies [4] [5]. Courts in late 2025 were explicit that the USDA has authority to tap emergency reserves under some readings of law, but the USDA sought to limit that use citing interpretations that contingency funds are for discrete disasters or supplemental needs rather than routine monthly benefits during a funding lapse [1] [6]. These tensions underscore that USDA/FNS controls the mechanisms, but not unreviewable discretion when litigation or statutory text constrains action.
2. Two separate trigger pathways — court orders and statutory emergency allotments
There are two distinct trigger pathways that emerged repeatedly in recent reporting: judicial intervention or contingency draws during appropriations lapses, and statutory emergency allotments tied to public-health or disaster declarations. The first pathway occurred during the 2025 government shutdown when federal judges in multiple districts ordered the USDA to use contingency balances or emergency funds to pay SNAP benefits, finding the agency could and should act to avoid immediate harm to recipients [1] [6]. The second pathway stems from USDA guidance during the COVID era: emergency allotments require a HHS public-health emergency declaration plus a state emergency declaration or disaster declaration, after which USDA/FNS authorizes month-to-month emergency allotments and states administer issuance [3] [7]. The two pathways are legally and operationally distinct, and mixing them fuels confusion.
3. How courts reshaped practice in late 2025 — judges versus agency positions
Federal courts in October–November 2025 compelled the USDA to release at least partial SNAP payments, ordering use of contingency funds or emergency reserves to prevent beneficiaries from going without food, even as the USDA asserted it lacked authority or that funds were not appropriated for routine monthly benefits [1] [2]. Judges in Rhode Island and Massachusetts issued conflicting immediate relief and requests for briefing, prompting temporary distributions of billions and legal briefs over statutory interpretation. The rulings reflect courts prioritizing immediate harm avoidance and interpreting contingency funding broadly, while the USDA and some political opponents argued that such uses would violate appropriations law or precedent about contingency fund scope [8] [9]. The litigation highlighted that in crises the judiciary can effectively trigger emergency funding where agencies decline to act.
4. The COVID-era emergency allotments framework still matters — criteria and limits
USDA guidance from the COVID period established a mechanical trigger for emergency allotments: a national Public Health Emergency by HHS under Section 319 plus a state emergency or disaster declaration, with USDA issuing waivers and permitting monthly state actions and orderly phase-outs. That guidance governed much of 2020–2023 practice, provided predictable criteria, and required coordination and notice periods when ending allotments [7] [3]. The COVID framework differs from contingency draws because it rests on a statutory public-health authority and explicit waiver mechanisms rather than ad hoc interpretations of contingency funds. Analysts and some states point to that framework as the lawful route for broad emergency allotments, while others emphasize contingency funds only for discrete disaster-response uses.
5. Political and policy takeaways — who benefits from which interpretation
Competing interpretations have clear political angles: advocates for uninterrupted benefits emphasize broad use of contingency funds and judicial relief to protect recipients, while opponents stress strict adherence to appropriations law and limited contingency use to constrain executive spending without Congress [2] [9]. States varied in response, with some stepping in to supplement benefits and others unable to do so, magnifying disparities. The 2025 disputes illustrate that the practical availability of emergency SNAP funding depends not just on USDA/FNS authority but on litigation outcomes, Congressional appropriations, and whether a public-health or disaster declaration provides the statutory trigger — creating multiple levers that stakeholders invoke to argue for or against emergency distribution [4] [5].