What was Egypt's administration of Gaza before the 1967 Six-Day War?
Executive summary
From 1948 until the 1967 Six‑Day War, the Gaza Strip was administered by Egypt under direct military rule rather than annexation, with intermittent interruption during the 1956 Suez Crisis when Israel occupied Gaza for several months [1] [2] [3]. Cairo did not grant Gazans Egyptian citizenship, governed the territory through a military governor, tolerated Palestinian refugee camps supported by UNRWA, and maintained policies that limited movement and integration—features that shaped Gaza’s economy and politics until Israel’s 1967 occupation [4] [1] [5].
1. How Egypt came to administer Gaza: armistice lines and military occupation
Following the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, armistice agreements left the Gaza–Rafah sector under Egyptian control and established Egyptian administration of the strip, with Egyptian forces setting up a military presence that endured as the basic framework of governance [6] [2]. Historians and reference works consistently describe Gaza as effectively under Egyptian military rule from 1948–1956 and again from 1957–1967, marking Egyptian control as the defining political reality until the Six‑Day War [1] [2].
2. Administration without annexation: military governor, All‑Palestine Government as façade
Egypt never annexed Gaza or made its residents Egyptian nationals; instead the territory was run by a military governor and treated as a controlled zone rather than integrated province [4] [7]. The nominal authority of the All‑Palestine Government, proclaimed in Gaza in 1948, was largely symbolic and dependent on Egyptian support; Nasser dissolved or sidelined the APG by 1959 and Cairo’s military administration became the de facto power on the ground [3] [8].
3. Social and economic reality: refugees, limited opportunities, and UN relief
Gaza’s chief social and economic problem under Egyptian administration was the massive refugee presence—some sources cite over 200,000 refugees arriving in 1948—creating overcrowded camps and depressed living standards that depended heavily on UNRWA relief and remittances [4] [1] [5]. Egyptian policies restricted Gazans’ movement and did not allow absorption as citizens, which kept the labor market constrained and tied economic opportunity to the limited local economy and cross‑border work when permitted [4] [5].
4. Security dynamics: fedayeen operations, PLO claims, and military posture
During the Egyptian period Gaza functioned as a base for Palestinian fedayeen raids into Israel and as a locus of nascent Palestinian military organization; when the PLO was founded in 1964, Nasser proclaimed it should exercise authority over Gaza, but that authority was more rhetorical than administrative, and conscription into Palestinian forces was declared without fully effective control [3] [8]. Cairo’s tolerance of irregular fighters complicated relations with Israel and figured into the border clashes and cross‑border planning that escalated regional tensions in the 1950s and 1960s [2] [9].
5. Interruptions and limits of Egyptian control: the 1956 Suez Crisis
Egyptian rule was interrupted by the 1956 Suez Crisis when Israeli forces occupied Gaza for several months as part of the Kadesh operation; international pressure and diplomatic maneuvering led to Israel’s withdrawal in 1957 and the restoration of Egyptian military administration, underscoring both the fragility and international dimensions of Cairo’s control [2] [3].
6. The end of Egyptian administration and its legacy
Egyptian administration ended with Israel’s capture of Gaza in the June 1967 Six‑Day War, after which Israel established military governance over the territory; in later decades Egypt formally renounced territorial claims to Gaza in the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace process and has since voiced support for a Palestinian state including Gaza, but the formative effects of the 1948–1967 period—demographic displacement, constrained economic development, and the political marginality of Gazans under non‑annexationary military rule—remained salient in subsequent conflicts and governance debates [3] [7] [1].