How did the Enabling Act passage procedurally occur in the Reichstag on March 23, 1933 and who voted for it?
Executive summary
The Reichstag passed the Enabling Act on 23 March 1933 in a tightly staged session at the Kroll Opera House that combined legal procedure with concerted political intimidation and the exclusion of Communist deputies, producing a supermajority that transferred legislative power to Hitler’s cabinet [1] [2]. The act passed 444 to 94, with the Nazi Party, its DNVP coalition partners and the Catholic Centre Party providing the decisive votes while the Social Democrats voted in unified opposition [3] [4] [5].
1. Legal mechanics and the two‑thirds rule
Because the Enabling Act amended the Weimar Constitution, its adoption required a two‑thirds majority of the Reichstag, meaning enough deputies had to be present and at least two‑thirds of those present had to approve the measure [6]. The bill—formally the “Law to Remedy the Distress of the People and the Reich”—was drafted to vest the Reich government with the authority to enact laws, even those contrary to the constitution, without Reichstag or presidential consent for a set period [2] [5].
2. Atmosphere: venue, paramilitary presence and purged opposition
The vote was held in the Kroll Opera House rather than the Reichstag building, and SA and SS forces were posted inside and around the chamber to intimidate deputies and the public, a visible part of the environment in which the session took place [1] [2]. The Reichstag Fire Decree and subsequent repression meant that the Communist parliamentary delegation (KPD) was effectively removed from the roll—many of its 81 deputies had been arrested or prevented from attending—which materially reduced opposition and changed the arithmetic of the required majority [1] [7].
3. Political bargaining: Centre Party assurances and conservative support
Hitler’s government secured extra‑parliamentary guarantees and negotiated directly with conservative and Catholic leaders to win votes; crucially, the Centre Party’s leadership agreed to back the measure after negotiations and verbal assurances, a deal finalized on 22 March that persuaded the Centre’s 73 deputies to vote for the law [1] [4]. The German National People’s Party (DNVP) and other conservative and nationalist deputies also aligned with the Reich government, filling out the pro‑Enabling Act majority [3] [4].
4. The vote tally and who opposed it
On 23 March the Reichstag recorded 444 votes in favor and 94 against; the Social Democratic Party (SPD) deputies were the only group to vote en bloc against the bill, led by SPD parliamentary chairman Otto Wels, while the Communist deputies were absent and therefore did not cast votes [3] [5] [8]. The numerical outcome reflected a coalition of Nazi deputies, DNVP nationalists and the Centre Party, together delivering the two‑thirds threshold needed to transform parliamentary lawmaking into cabinet decree power [4] [9].
5. Interpretation, intent and the role of intimidation
Contemporary and later accounts emphasize that the passage combined legal procedure with coercion: the vote complied with formal Reichstag rules but took place after a campaign of arrests, violence, and legal suspension (Reichstag Fire Decree) that removed, intimidated or silenced opponents, raising persistent questions about whether the Act’s adoption could be considered legitimate under the Weimar constitution [7] [5]. Sources note hidden political agendas—industrial and conservative elites who saw Hitler as a bulwark against communism and parliamentary paralysis, and Nazi leaders who used legal forms to provide a veneer of legality while eliminating institutional checks—so the outcome blended parliamentary votes with extra‑legal pressure and negotiated concessions to conservative forces [1] [6].