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How do Robert O. Paxton and Zeev Sternhell define fascism?
Executive Summary
Robert O. Paxton defines fascism primarily as a mode of political behavior driven by mobilizing passions — an obsessive preoccupation with decline, victimhood, and the primacy of the in-group that produces cults of unity, energy, and purity; he treats fascism as a dynamic, situational phenomenon that arises where elites and movements collide [1] [2]. Zeev Sternhell defines fascism as a cultural-intellectual movement that evolves from European cultural rebellions against materialism and positivism, developing into an ideologized, revolutionary nationalism that became a mass political force by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries [3] [4]. Both scholars agree fascism is complex and multifaceted, but they emphasize different origins and mechanisms: Paxton centers behavior and crisis-driven mobilization, while Sternhell centers cultural roots and ideological formation [1] [3].
1. Why Paxton’s “political behavior” framing forces a rethink of fascism’s triggers
Paxton argues fascism is best understood as a pattern of political action rooted in passions rather than a coherent doctrine; his formulation highlights an overwhelming sense of crisis, group primacy, victim narratives, and leadership by “natural” authorities that animate mass mobilization and violent practice. This behavioral lens shifts attention to how fascist movements exploit social dysfunction and coalitions with conservative elites to seize power, as Paxton shows through comparative studies of Italy and Germany where fascism took different institutional forms despite shared mobilizing passions [1] [2]. Paxton’s emphasis that fascism is not monolithic but a set of mobilizing tactics underscores why similar outcomes can emerge across different national contexts without an identical ideology, and it foregrounds the role of opportunistic elite alliances in transforming movement energy into state power [2].
2. How Sternhell locates fascism in Europe’s cultural currents and an ideologized modernity
Sternhell locates the origins of fascism in a broader cultural rebellion against liberal modernity, materialism, and positivist science, arguing that intellectual and cultural currents produced a distinct fascist worldview long before it became a mass political movement. His thesis, articulated in The Birth of Fascist Ideology, traces how a gentlemanly cultural phenomenon mutated into popular ideology that fused nationalism with revolutionary rhetoric, producing an ideologized, doctrinal fascism that aimed at cultural regeneration as much as political domination [3] [4]. Sternhell’s account explains the depth of fascist symbolism and the movement’s appeal to elites and intellectuals, suggesting fascism’s political success depended on long-standing cultural anxieties and ideological ferment rather than only short-term crises.
3. Where Paxton and Sternhell converge — and why that matters for historians
Both scholars converge on the idea that fascism cannot be reduced to a single, tidy definition and that it emerges from complex social, cultural, and political mixtures; each stresses historical depth and contingency. Paxton and Sternhell agree that fascism was not merely an Italian oddity but had broader European roots and resonances, with shared elements of nationalism, anti-liberalism, and mass mobilization evident across cases [2] [3]. Their convergence matters because it pushes the field beyond typologies that either over-intellectualize fascism as pure ideology or over-simplify it as mere authoritarianism; together they show fascism combines cultural narratives, mobilizing passions, and pragmatic elite-movement linkages that produce varied outcomes in different contexts.
4. Where they diverge — practical consequences for diagnosing modern risks
Paxton’s focus on behavior and elite collusion implies contemporary warnings should center on political practices: scapegoating narratives, crisis rhetoric, and alliances between conservative institutions and militant movements. Sternhell’s emphasis on cultural and intellectual origins implies analysts should also track long-term ideological shifts and cultural resentments that normalize revolutionary nationalism. The divergence yields different policy and scholarly priorities: Paxton suggests monitoring political dynamics and institutional weakness, while Sternhell recommends attention to cultural production, intellectual currents, and the mainstreaming of anti-liberal ideas [1] [3].
5. Scholarly debate and critiques — what critics highlight and what remains unsettled
Critics noted in later analyses argue that Sternhell may overstate fascism’s intellectual coherence and early origins, while Paxton’s behavioral model may underplay the role of ideology in sustaining regimes; debates thus focus on whether fascism is primarily doctrine or practice [5]. Other scholars emphasize alternative models—bureaucratic authoritarianism, personalist dictatorship, or populist authoritarianism—highlighting that fascism overlaps with but is not identical to these categories [5]. The scholarly dispute reveals persistent uncertainties: how to weigh elite agency versus mass cultural shifts, and how to identify threshold conditions that differentiate violent fascist mobilization from other forms of radical politics. Both Paxton and Sternhell provide complementary tools for diagnosis, but neither fully resolves the definitional debates that continue to preoccupy historians and political scientists [5].