Russian veneration of the great patriotic war is hypocritical in view of interwar support for Weimar and nazi germany

1. A sacred war turned state mythology

The Great Patriotic War has been transformed from mass suffering and victory into a “sacred” national myth employed by the Kremlin to unify society and underpin great‑power claims; scholars and policy analysts document how the state amplified heroic tropes since the Soviet era and especially under Putin to legitimize policy and mobilize public sentiment ^{[6] [7] [1]}.

2. How memory is being weaponised today

Russian leaders repeatedly invoke WWII themes in rhetoric about Ukraine, framing modern operations as a continuation or defense of the 1941–45 legacy; analysts trace a direct line from Victory Day politics to narratives that portray Kyiv and the West as heirs of “fascism,” a claim used to justify intervention ^{[8] [2] [9]}.

3. The inconvenient interwar record

Historical sources show a long and complex Soviet–German relationship before Hitler’s attack: diplomatic rapprochement (Rapallo, 1922), covert military collaboration where the USSR hosted German training and testing facilities in the 1920s–early 1930s, and the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop non‑aggression pact with secret protocols carving up Poland and Eastern Europe ^{[3] [4] [5] [10]}.

4. Not an either/or question: cooperation then, catastrophe later

Evidence establishes that the USSR cooperated with German states at intervals—driven by strategic isolation, security calculus and realpolitik—yet this did not prevent Hitler’s 1941 invasion nor negate the massive Soviet sacrifices in the subsequent war. Historians emphasize the relationship’s complexity: an on‑again, off‑again pattern that culminated in both cooperation and catastrophic conflict ^{[11] [12] [13]}.

5. Why critics call contemporary veneration “hypocritical”

Critics argue that celebrating the Soviet role as anti‑fascist while sidelining episodes of Soviet realpolitik—tacit support for Weimar rearmament, the 1939 pact, and economic exchanges with Nazi Germany—amounts to selective memory and political instrumentalisation of history ^{[14] [15] [10]}. Those critics cite state narratives that begin the Great Patriotic War in June 1941, which omits earlier Soviet actions that shaped the prewar map ^{[8] [16]}.

6. The state’s motive: legitimacy, social cohesion, foreign policy cover

Commentators and scholars tie the Kremlin’s emphasis on Victory Day and war mythmaking to a need for domestic legitimacy, a unifying founding myth, and a rhetorical tool to delegitimise opponents and justify interventions abroad—making the memory of 1941–45 a living instrument of policy rather than a neutral historical commemoration ^{[1] [7] [17]}.

7. Alternative perspectives and scholarly nuance

Scholars stress nuance: the Soviet–German interwar ties are well documented, but they emerged from diplomatic isolation and security anxieties, not ideological alignment; likewise, invoking the war to explain modern policy does not erase the genuine trauma and heroism of 27 million Soviet dead—memory and state interest can coexist ^{[11] [6] [18]}.

8. What reporting leaves out or does not mention

Available sources document both the Kremlin’s instrumentalisation of memory and the documented Soviet–German interactions, but they do not settle questions of individual moral responsibility for interwar policy decisions or whether contemporary Russian citizens uniformly endorse state narratives—those specifics are not found in current reporting presented here (not found in current reporting).

9. Bottom line for readers

The charge of hypocrisy has evidentiary weight because the Russian state now sanctifies a wartime narrative while glossing over episodes of Soviet diplomacy and cooperation with Germany in the interwar years; understanding that tension requires accepting both the historical facts of cooperation (Rapallo, covert training, 1939 pact) and the genuine centrality of WWII trauma to Russian identity ^{[3] [5] [6]}.