What is the current status of the Venezuela-Guyana Essequibo territorial dispute as of December 2025?
Executive summary
As of December 2025 the dispute remains live and tense: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has jurisdiction and issued provisional measures in 2023 ordering Venezuela not to change the status quo, but Venezuela has repeatedly taken unilateral steps (referendum, laws naming Essequibo a Venezuelan state, and attempts to hold elections) and rejected or defied some court orders, producing incidents at sea and armed attacks that raised regional alarm (ICJ order and Venezuela’s moves cited in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]). International actors — Guyana, CARICOM members, Brazil and the U.S. — back Guyana’s territorial integrity while calls for peaceful, legal resolution continue [6], [7], [8].
1. ICJ control and the legal battlefield
The central legal fact: Guyana took the case to the International Court of Justice and the Court found it has jurisdiction; in December 2020 the ICJ accepted Guyana’s application and in December 2023 it ordered provisional measures to preserve the status quo, warning of risk of “irreparable prejudice” if Venezuela took steps to alter control of the territory [2], [1]. The ICJ remains the formal forum for resolution even as Caracas contests or rejects parts of the Court’s rulings [1], [3].
2. Venezuela’s unilateral political and legal steps
Since late 2023 Venezuela has pursued domestic legal and political measures aimed at asserting sovereignty over Essequibo: a national consultative referendum in December 2023, laws in 2024 declaring the area a Venezuelan state and assigning resource rights, and moves to include the region in Venezuelan provincial election planning — actions Caracas frames as reasserting historical claims [2], [9], [10], [4]. The ICJ and several foreign governments have viewed many of those acts as provocative and potentially illegal under the provisional measures [1], [6].
3. Militarized and criminal escalation on land and at sea
Tensions have spilled beyond diplomacy. There were reported incidents of Venezuelan naval activity in waters Guyana views as its EEZ, including a March 1, 2025 naval incursion that approached offshore oil operations, and a string of armed attacks on Guyanese forces patrolling the disputed hinterland — incidents that wounded Guyanese soldiers and prompted regional and U.S. warnings [11], [4], [5], [7]. Sources describe concerns that Venezuelan state action, private armed groups, or criminal networks operating from Venezuelan territory have increased the security risks in Essequibo [5], [12].
4. Oil, resources and why the dispute matters now
The dispute regained urgency after commercial oil discoveries off Essequibo’s coast; Guyana’s offshore developments (including ExxonMobil activity noted in reporting) have raised the strategic and economic stakes and sharpened Venezuelan claims to maritime and land areas thought to contain hydrocarbons and minerals [5], [10]. Analysts say resource incentives help explain the timing and intensity of Caracas’s moves [12], [4].
5. International and regional responses — backing, mediation, and threat of coercion
Regional actors and major powers have largely backed Guyana’s territorial integrity and urged legal resolution via the ICJ. CARICOM and neighbors pressed for restraint after the 2023 referendum, and meetings at the U.N. Security Council and private consultations underscored international concern [6], [8]. The U.S. publicly warned Venezuela after maritime incidents and several governments condemned provocations, raising the diplomatic cost to Caracas [7], [12].
6. Competing narratives and political incentives
Venezuela frames Essequibo as historically Venezuelan territory dating to colonial-era borders and treats its popular referendum and laws as domestic remedies to that claim; the government has defended actions as patriotic and constitutional [10], [3]. Guyana insists the 1899 Paris Arbitral Award and current administration of the territory make Essequibo Guyanese and stresses the ICJ route as the lawful means of settlement [2], [1]. Analysts warn Maduro’s government has domestic political incentives to press the claim, while others highlight genuine security and economic calculations [9], [12].
7. Where this leaves the dispute in December 2025
The dispute is unresolved and fraught: the ICJ remains the legal arena with proceedings and provisional measures on record, Venezuela has continued unilateral political and occasional coercive actions, and incidents at sea and armed attacks have kept the situation volatile and liable to further escalation without robust de‑escalation mechanisms [1], [4], [5]. International mediation and monitoring — including regional diplomacy and UN attention — continue to be the principal brakes on open interstate war [6], [8].
Limitations and gaps: available sources do not provide a final ICJ judgment date in these excerpts, and detailed classified military deployments or secret diplomatic backchannels are not described in the materials supplied; timelines beyond late 2025 are not covered here (not found in current reporting).