Saudi
Executive summary
Saudi Arabia in early 2026 is navigating a decisive pivot from headline projects to institutional reform at home while expanding diplomatic and financial outreach abroad: Riyadh is entering a "third phase" of Vision 2030 focused on maximizing impact and shifting more implementation to the private sector [1], it has opened its capital markets fully to foreign investors from February 1 to attract global capital [2] [3], and it remains active diplomatically—joining U.S. initiatives and mediating regional crises such as Sudan [4] [5].
1. Economic recalibration: from launch to delivery
Saudi leaders told international audiences in Davos that 2026 marks the start of a "third phase" of Vision 2030, a stage described in official budget documents as moving from launching economic reforms to maximizing their impact, with more of the programme’s scope being handed to private firms to avoid overheating and improve execution [1]. That recalibration comes amid both signs of structural change—the non‑oil sector now reportedly constitutes more than 55% of real GDP, according to Saudi officials cited in reporting [1]—and practical constraints: marquee projects such as NEOM and The Line have faced delays, cost pressures and strategic reviews, prompting workforce cuts and reassessments [1] [6].
2. Opening markets to foreign capital: a strategic bet
In a concrete move to draw foreign money, Saudi regulators announced the removal of restrictions on foreign participation in equities effective February 1, eliminating prior qualification thresholds and allowing all foreign investors access to the kingdom’s bourse, a step markets and Bloomberg framed as an effort to boost flows into the Middle East’s largest market [2] [3]. This policy dovetails with other initiatives—such as ETFs and partnerships in Asia—and is part of a broader push to diversify financing away from oil revenues even as Saudi issuance and debt-market tapping have increased to bridge budget gaps when oil prices lag [1] [2].
3. Diplomacy and regional influence: coalition-building and mediation
Riyadh’s foreign policy in early 2026 combines coalition-building and mediation: Saudi Arabia joined U.S. President Trump’s “Board of Peace” along with several regional powers, signaling closer alignment with Washington-led initiatives [4], and the kingdom has continued playing a central role in efforts to secure a humanitarian ceasefire in Sudan through high-level talks with U.S. officials and regional actors under the Jeddah process framework [5]. Independent outlets note growing strains with the UAE over competing regional models—support for proxy actors versus preserving state borders—indicating Riyadh is actively shaping alignments across the Horn of Africa and the Levant even as rivalries simmer [7].
4. Domestic narrative and soft power: aid, culture and public rituals
Saudi outlets and regional press highlight soft‑power moves that bolster domestic and international narratives: official aid agencies and state-aligned papers emphasize Riyadh’s role among top global humanitarian donors and cultural programming such as major events and publishing initiatives [8] [9]. At the same time, the kingdom’s religious calendar and mosque guidance remain newsworthy domestically—moon-sighting updates influence public life and rituals, as when authorities reported no sighting for Shaaban 1447 AH, which shapes the timing of Ramadan [10].
5. Risks, skepticism and limits of reporting
Consensus reporting documents both achievements and vulnerabilities: Vision 2030’s new phase recognizes previous under-delivery on some flagship ventures and more reliance on private capital [1] [6], and opening capital markets carries political and financial risk if inflows prove volatile [2] [3]. Some outlets interpret Riyadh’s activism as opportunistic vis‑à‑vis a weakened Iran or as part of broader geopolitical hedging [11], while regional analyses warn that Saudi-UAE tensions could reshape alliances and generate unintended conflict dynamics [7]. This survey relies on the provided reporting; areas such as on-the-ground political dissent, detailed budget line-items, or internal decision-making processes are not covered in the sources and therefore cannot be assessed here.