What legal arguments were made in court about whether the 2009 settlement barred Virginia Giuffre from suing third parties?
Executive summary
The core dispute in court was whether the 2009 settlement between Virginia Giuffre and Jeffrey Epstein—which used broad release language covering “second parties” and “any other person or entity who could have been included as a potential defendant”—operated as an enforceable waiver that barred Giuffre from suing third parties such as Prince Andrew and Alan Dershowitz; defendants argued the release did bar such suits, while Giuffre and the court emphasized ambiguity, limiting the release’s reach and allowing at least some claims to proceed [1] [2] [3].
1. Defendants’ central legal theory: the 2009 release was deliberately broad and extinguished third‑party claims
Prince Andrew’s and Dershowitz’s lawyers pressed that the settlement’s text effectually waived Giuffre’s right to pursue “any and all” civil claims against people connected to Epstein by including “other potential defendants,” arguing the document was a comprehensive “general release” intended to protect Epstein’s inner circle and therefore required dismissal of later suits against those people [4] [1] [5]. Their briefs framed Epstein as having negotiated a wide shield covering unnamed third parties—language that, if given a plain and expansive reading, would extinguish the specific claims now brought against figures who were not named in 2009 [4] [1].
2. Giuffre’s counterargument: the release is ambiguous and cannot be read to waive unknown third‑party claims
Giuffre’s camp and sympathetic commentators stressed that the 2009 agreement did not identify Andrew or other individuals by name and that phrases like “potential defendants” and “second parties” are vague and susceptible to multiple meanings; therefore, the release cannot be interpreted as a clear, unambiguous relinquishment of her right to sue third parties without more explicit language [6] [1]. Observers noted that when settlements purport to release claims against third parties, courts typically require unmistakably clear wording to deprive a litigant of future remedies—an argument Giuffre’s lawyers invoked to resist dismissal [6].
3. Judicial response: ambiguity mattered and dispositive interpretation was premature
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan rejected the motion to dismiss in January 2022, explaining that the 2009 agreement’s use of the term “potential” was itself of uncertain legal meaning and that only Epstein could explain his intent, which was impossible after his death; Kaplan concluded the agreement was ambiguous as to whether it was meant to directly benefit Prince Andrew and therefore it was premature to rule the entire lawsuit barred at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage [2] [7]. Kaplan’s ruling left open that the release could be used as a defense at trial or on a more developed record, but made clear that ambiguity in a release weakens a third‑party defense to immediate dismissal [7] [6].
4. Practical consequences and precedents: partial wins, unsettled law, and tactical use
The 2009 release has produced mixed results: Dershowitz successfully invoked the language in earlier proceedings to secure dismissal of claims against him in at least one instance, showing the settlement can have real defensive value when read to cover particular categories named in the 2009 filings, but it has not uniformly shielded all accused third parties from litigation [5] [1]. Commentary from practitioners stressed that settlement clauses must be unambiguous to bar third‑party claims—if a release expressly named a person, that person would fare better; absent such naming, courts scrutinize whether the parties intended to relinquish specific future claims [6] [8].
5. Limits of reporting and lingering questions
Public documents and contemporaneous reporting establish the textual positions and Judge Kaplan’s ruling, but the sealed history and the fact Epstein is dead leave the parties and the court to infer intent from disputed, sometimes redacted, filings; reporting has highlighted the legal arguments and the judge’s reliance on ambiguity but cannot reveal Epstein’s subjective intent, which the judge said would be determinative if known [2] [9] [3]. Some outlets emphasize the settlement’s protective language for “other potential defendants,” while others emphasize judicial caution and precedent that ambiguous releases should not be read to strip claimants of remedies without clear, direct language—both positions are supported by the cited filings and rulings [4] [6] [7].