Which ADL or university programs brought U.S. law enforcement, including ICE, to Israel and who appears on their participant lists?
Executive summary
Multiple U.S.–Israel exchange programs — notably the Anti-Defamation League’s National Counter‑Terrorism Seminar (ADL NCTS), Georgia State University’s Georgia International Law Enforcement Exchange (GILEE), and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs’ (JINSA) Law Enforcement Exchange — have organized travel and training that brought U.S. local, state and federal law enforcement personnel, including ICE and other homeland security officials, to Israel; reporting and campaign groups say participant rosters include police chiefs, deputy chiefs, homeland security and border‑patrol executives, and at least one acting ICE deputy director, while program operators dispute characterizations of the curriculum and scope [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. ADL’s counter‑terrorism seminars: scope and named participants
The ADL’s National Counter‑Terrorism Seminar in Israel is repeatedly identified by critics and FOIA‑based researchers as a key facilitator that has “regularly” taken senior U.S. law‑enforcement figures — police chiefs and top brass as well as homeland security, Border Patrol and ICE executives — to meet Israeli police, army and security officials, and ADL itineraries explicitly list such meetings with Israel National Police spokespeople and military/security researchers [1] [5]. Campaigners compiling participant data and local reporting say more than 100 U.S. police departments have sent representatives since the early 2000s [5] [6]. The Guardian’s analysis of BlueLeaks material also shows ADL staff were registered attendees and facilitators at U.S. fusion‑center events sharing training or intelligence with police agencies [7].
2. GILEE (Georgia International Law Enforcement Exchange): institutional role and scale
GILEE, run out of Georgia State University, has been the longest‑running institutional conduit for police exchanges with Israel and elsewhere, describing itself as offering executive development programs and peer‑to‑peer site training; outside reporting and activist tallies put participants in the thousands across conferences and workshops and cite GILEE’s annual conferences and Atlanta events as venues where dozens or hundreds of U.S. officers and executives meet Israeli counterparts [2] [8] [4]. Activist research attributes large cumulative participation figures—tens of thousands in some claims for affiliated workshops and events—while GILEE’s own materials emphasize “best practices” and say they do not provide tactical field training for line officers [8] [2].
3. JINSA and other university/think‑tank programs: who they say attends
JINSA’s Law Enforcement Exchange and similar programs have acknowledged bringing “more than 200 U.S. federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement executives” to Israel and hosting thousands in U.S. conferences with Israeli experts, with JINSA defending the exchanges as counterterrorism and executive development rather than operational tactics training [3]. Local activists and campaign pages, citing FOIAs, list specific participants including municipal police chiefs and, in some cases, named senior federal figures such as an acting ICE deputy director — a detail repeated across Deadly Exchange filings and secondary reporting [3] [4] [9].
4. What the participant lists show — central patterns and disputes
Across compiled research and campaign reporting, participant lists consistently show senior leadership — chiefs, deputy chiefs, fusion‑center representatives, and senior federal law‑enforcement officials — rather than rank‑and‑file officers, with explicit mentions of ICE, border‑security and homeland‑security executives attending ADL and other delegations [1] [9] [4]. Advocates such as Deadly Exchange and Jewish Voice for Peace argue these leadership exchanges transmit “worst practices” and militarized approaches learned from Israeli security services into U.S. policing, while program organizers (JINSA, GILEE, ADL) push back, framing the trips as counterterrorism education and peer exchange with no field tactical training [9] [3] [2].
5. Limits of the record and consequential implications
Available public reporting and FOIA‑based databases document many programs and dozens to hundreds of named delegations and high‑level participants, but no single public roster comprehensively lists every attendee across all programs and years; researchers therefore rely on FOIAs, leaked files and organizational admissions to build participant maps, producing contested totals and interpretations — activists emphasize civil‑rights implications, while program leaders emphasize counterterrorism rationale and dispute claims of tactical transfer [9] [4] [3].