What legal arguments did Judge Aileen Cannon use to justify keeping Smith’s Volume II report sealed?
Executive summary
Judge Aileen Cannon justified keeping Volume II of Special Counsel Jack Smith’s report sealed primarily on grounds of protecting the fair-trial and due-process rights of Trump’s co‑defendants, asserting court authority to restrain disclosure while related prosecutions remained possible and invoking her earlier ruling that Smith was improperly appointed as a basis for limiting release; she also issued a limited path for the President to seek further relief, actions that have drawn sharp challenges from the Justice Department and transparency advocates [1] [2] [3] [4]. Critics say those rationales exceed her authority and amount to undue delay and suppression of a document ordinarily eligible for disclosure [5] [6] [7].
1. Cannon’s principal legal rationale: protecting co‑defendants’ fair‑trial and due‑process rights
Cannon’s January order barred the Department of Justice from releasing Volume II on the ground that disclosure could prejudice the fair‑trial and due‑process rights of Trump’s co‑defendants—specifically Waltine Nauta and Carlos De Oliveira—whose prosecutions were, at that time, still potentially pending, and she framed non‑release as necessary to prevent prejudice to those defendants [1] [8] [2].
2. Reliance on her prior appointment‑clause ruling as a reason to seal findings
Judge Cannon tied the question of public release to her earlier decision that Special Counsel Jack Smith had been unconstitutionally appointed in that prosecution, arguing that that legal defect supported limiting the dissemination of Smith’s findings and, in some filings, suggesting the defective appointment could counsel toward permanent sealing of Smith’s work [2] [9].
3. Use of injunctive authority to restrain DOJ and to create a procedural safety valve
Cannon exercised injunctive power to bar the Attorney General from making Volume II public and to keep the report confined to the executive branch and the court’s chambers, while also temporarily lifting certain restrictions only to give President Trump a 60‑day window to challenge disclosure—an accommodation that effectively maintained the seal while permitting further litigation [10] [11] [12].
4. Invoking grand‑jury and nonpublic information protections
Part of the justification for non‑disclosure was tied to statutory and procedural limits on who may disseminate grand‑jury or other nonpublic investigative material; Cannon’s orders have been read to bar Smith or others from disclosing “nonpublic information” contained in Volume II, invoking secrecy rules that normally circumscribe grand‑jury material and investigative reports [3] [5].
5. Timing, jurisdiction, and prudential considerations emphasized by the court
Cannon questioned the urgency of immediate public release given ongoing legal contingencies—most prominently the possibility that appellate courts could revive prosecutions—and framed her restraint as a prudential exercise of jurisdiction to avoid prejudicing potential future proceedings, a rationale reflected in her scheduling and procedural choices [8] [1].
6. Counterarguments from DOJ, transparency advocates, and appellate scrutiny
The Justice Department argued the district court lacked authority to block release and urged reversal, saying Cannon had “no basis at all” to stop public disclosure of at least parts of Smith’s report, while watchdog groups and the Knight First Amendment Institute pushed for release as no longer necessary to protect government interests; an appeals panel later chastised Cannon for “undue delay” and gave her a deadline to resolve motions, signaling skepticism about indefinite suppression [5] [6] [1].
7. What the record does and does not show about Cannon’s legal footing
Public reporting documents Cannon’s stated legal reasons—protecting co‑defendants’ trial rights, invoking her appointment‑clause ruling, protecting nonpublic investigative material, and using injunctions to control disclosure—and also records robust disagreement from DOJ and press‑freedom groups about the propriety and scope of those steps; the sources do not provide full transcriptions of her legal opinion here, so finer doctrinal arguments and statutory citations in her written orders require review of the actual filings for definitive analysis [1] [2] [5] [6].