How would Bill C-2 change lawful access rules for Canadian intelligence agencies and what precedent exists in Five Eyes partners?

Checked on December 19, 2025
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Executive summary

Bill C-2 would create a statutory “lawful access” regime in Canada that expands authorities to demand subscriber and transmission data, introduces exigent and warrantless information demands in some circumstances, and compels electronic service providers to build and maintain technical capabilities to assist investigators — changes framed by government as closing a gap with Five Eyes partners but criticized for weak safeguards and secrecy [1] [2] [3] [4]. Comparable regimes already exist in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, providing a patchwork of precedents that Canada’s drafters point to even as privacy groups warn those models have permitted broad powers and contested uses [4] [5] [6].

1. What Bill C-2 would actually change in lawful access rules

Parts 14 and 15 of Bill C-2 amend the Criminal Code and create the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA), authorizing new production orders, “information demands” that can be made without a warrant in exigent situations, a distinct tracking warrant, and cross-border production mechanisms to compel foreign providers to produce transmission or subscriber data on a low “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard [2] [1] [7]. The SAAIA would also permit orders requiring electronic service providers to install or maintain technical capabilities to extract or provide data — subject only to a prohibition on creating a “systemic vulnerability,” a term critics say is undefined and therefore porous [1] [8]. The bill tightens timelines, imposes gag provisions that can bar recipients from disclosing the demand for up to a year and gives providers only a short window to challenge — reportedly five days — raising practical and Charter-related concerns [9] [10].

2. How supporters justify the shift — closing a Five Eyes gap

Government and national security voices argue Canada is an outlier among Five Eyes and G7 countries for lacking a formal lawful access framework, saying modern transnational organized crime and the fentanyl trade demand interoperable tools and timely access to data to protect Canadians; official notes point explicitly to lessons from Five Eyes partners and prior consultations as justification [11] [3] [5]. CSIS and policing sources warn that current tools are “eroding” Canada’s ability to cooperate and benefit from Five Eyes intelligence sharing if Canada cannot meet partner expectations for access capabilities [5].

3. Precedent in Five Eyes partners — different models, different controversies

The United States relies on statutes and frameworks like CALEA and FISA to compel provider assistance and surveillance authorities, while the U.K.’s Investigatory Powers Act and Australia’s laws establish mandatory assistance and broader interception tools; New Zealand and Australia have recently adopted centralized approaches that influenced Canada’s drafting, yet all have generated legal challenges and scrutiny over encryption, secrecy and oversight [4] [6]. Importantly, some Five Eyes regimes have been criticized for permitting secretive orders or techniques — for example, litigation over U.K. orders to service providers and U.S. debates about FISA — underscoring that the “Five Eyes precedent” is not a uniform model of safeguards [4] [8].

4. Where legal risk and political backlash concentrate

Legal analysts and privacy groups say the low threshold for some orders, the expansion of warrantless demands, gag rules, compressed challenge timelines, and the capacity to compel technical changes risk conflict with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on reasonable expectations of privacy and may prompt constitutional challenges [1] [7] [9]. Civil-society advocacy frames the bill as an overreach that could undermine encryption and private life protections, while industry notices the new liabilities, operational burdens and cross-border jurisdictional friction from compelled foreign production [12] [13] [10].

5. Signs the government recalibrated under pressure

Faced with public and expert opposition, reporting shows the government later moved to remove the most controversial Parts 14 and 15 from a subsequent border bill, a reversal that highlights the political sensitivity and contested mandate for sweeping lawful-access reform in Canada [14]. That retreat indicates Canadian policymakers are balancing the diplomatic and operational arguments for alignment with Five Eyes against domestic legal norms and vocal privacy opposition [5] [14].

Want to dive deeper?
How have courts in Five Eyes countries ruled on government demands that affect encryption and provider assistance?
What specific safeguards (judicial review, transparency reports, minimization rules) have other Five Eyes countries implemented for lawful access and how effective are they?
What would a constitutional challenge to Bill C-2 look like under Supreme Court of Canada privacy jurisprudence?