What are the legal steps and timeline for Bulgaria’s Constitutional Court to accept a presidential resignation?

1. Legal basis: where the power to resign is written and what it requires

Under Article 97 of the Bulgarian Constitution, resignation submitted to the Constitutional Court is expressly listed as a ground for early termination of presidential (and vice‑presidential) mandates, meaning the president must tender the resignation to the Court rather than to Parliament or another body ^{[1] [4]}.

2. Submission: the formal act that starts the clock

The legal process begins when the president formally submits his or her resignation to the Constitutional Court; in the recent case, Rumen Radev announced his resignation on 19 January and formally lodged it with the Court the following day, on 20 January ^{[5] [2] [6]}.

3. Court consideration: discretionary review to establish voluntariness

Once the resignation is on the Court’s docket, the justices must determine whether the president resigned “of their own accord”; the Constitution and the Court’s practice leave the duration of that examination at the Court’s discretion, so there is no fixed statutory deadline for a ruling ^{[2] [1]}. Constitutional commentators say the Court should act promptly where there is no sign of coercion, and in practice judges set hearings and rapporteurs to prepare the case—for Radev the Court scheduled a sitting and appointed a rapporteur for Case No. 3 of 2026 ^{[7] [3]}.

4. Decision and effect: immediate termination once established

If the Constitutional Court establishes the resignation as voluntary, it issues a ruling terminating the president’s credentials and the transfer of full presidential powers occurs; the vice president then assumes the office for the remainder of the term ^{[2] [1]}. Multiple outlets reported that when the Court approved Radev’s resignation its decision took immediate effect and Vice President Iliana Iotova assumed the duties until the term’s scheduled expiry in January 2027 ^{[8] [9]}.

5. Timeline in practice: from submission to ruling in the Radev case

The recent sequence offers a concrete timeline: Radev announced his resignation on 19 January, submitted it to the Constitutional Court on 20 January, the Court convened a sitting and prepared the case (Case No. 3 of 2026), and the Court announced its approval on 23 January—four days after submission—after which a handover ceremony followed ^{[5] [7] [10] [8]}. Official and media accounts emphasize that no prior presidential resignation in post‑1991 Bulgaria set a firm precedent for timing, but the Court’s quick action in this instance reflects expectations that, absent coercion, the Court will rule without undue delay ^{[2] [3]}.

6. Contingencies and institutional backstops

The Constitution contemplates contingencies: if the vice president is unable to assume office, presidential powers fall to the chairperson of the National Assembly and, if necessary, early presidential elections must be held within two months ^[1]. Observers note that because no popularly elected Bulgarian president had resigned before, some aspects of practice remained untested and political stakes—especially in a country facing repeated elections—mean the Court’s pace carries political as well as legal consequences ^{[1] [4]}.

7. Politics, judges and the public interest: why speed matters

Commentators and legal experts quoted in reporting warned that prolonged hesitation by the Constitutional Court could invite constitutional uncertainty or political crisis, so even though the Court formally has discretion, there is strong normative pressure to decide quickly in clean cases; that pressure likely informed the Court’s rapid approval in late January ^{[3] [4]}. At the same time, partisan actors and the resigning president’s political ambitions create incentives for scrutiny and for critics to question motivations, an implicit agenda that the Court must navigate while remaining a legal arbiter ^{[5] [11]}.