Fact check: Can local law enforcement refuse to cooperate with ICE on immigration enforcement?

1. Why refusal is legally possible — the federalism gap that empowers local choices

The U.S. federal system does not generally grant the federal government unilateral authority to make state and local police into immigration enforcement agents, which means local jurisdictions can decline cooperation unless they enter delegation programs or face specific state mandates. Legal analyses and advocacy groups argue that compliance with ICE immigration detainers and enforcement requests is largely voluntary for local agencies, and several states have adopted statutes to bar such cooperation outright, reflecting a legal distinction between federal prerogatives and local obligations ^{[1] [2]}. This legal gap allows municipalities and state legislatures to set their own rules for interaction with ICE, producing a landscape where some agencies are prohibited from sharing information or honoring detainers, while others retain discretion to partner with federal authorities.

2. State laws turn discretion into prohibition in some places — Washington as a case study

Some states have converted that discretion into legal prohibition, instructing local police they may not assist ICE in immigration enforcement; Washington’s Keep Washington Working Act exemplifies this trend, with reporting in 2025 showing most Washington law enforcement agencies refusing to cooperate with ICE and departmental policies against recording immigration status ^{[3] [4]}. These statutes aim to protect community trust and prioritize local resources over federal immigration policing, and recent coverage indicates local chiefs are following the statutory commands even in the face of federal pressure, underscoring how state law can override local willingness to engage with ICE unless the locality chooses otherwise or joins a federal delegation program.

3. Voluntary federal programs create a parallel route to cooperation — 287(g) and deputization

Federal programs such as Section 287(g) permit local agencies to voluntarily delegate immigration authorities to deputized officers, and this program remains the primary legal mechanism for formal local-federal partnership in immigration enforcement ^{[5] [6]}. Participation in 287(g) requires agreements, training, and resource commitments, and jurisdictions can opt in or out; the program’s existence therefore does not mandate cooperation but provides an attractive incentive structure for willing agencies seeking ICE resources. Analyses of 287(g) also note costs and community consequences, and the program’s continued availability highlights that refusal to cooperate is an affirmative policy choice rather than an absence of federal tools to secure assistance ^[7].

4. Practice varies widely — substantial numbers still partner with ICE despite prohibitions elsewhere

Even as some states bar cooperation, hundreds of local law enforcement agencies continue to partner with ICE, according to mid‑2025 reporting that counted more than 600 partner agencies, illustrating a stark geographic and policy split ^[8]. Local politics, resource incentives, crime‑public safety narratives, and federal outreach can influence whether a department chooses to collaborate, and advocates on both sides frame the split differently: proponents of cooperation emphasize identification and removal of criminal aliens, while opponents emphasize community trust and civil rights implications. The coexistence of widespread cooperation in some areas and legal refusal in others demonstrates how policy frameworks and local priorities produce contrasting enforcement ecologies across the country.

5. Impacts, political framing, and possible agendas shaping reporting and policy

Reporting and advocacy reflect competing agendas: civil‑liberties groups and state legislatures that bar cooperation stress community safety and constitutional limits on federal commandeering, while ICE and proponents of local partnership emphasize law enforcement efficiency and public safety benefits of information sharing ^{[9] [2]}. News accounts often highlight practical outcomes — reduced detentions where cooperation ends, or increased federal reliance where it continues — but rarely resolve normative disputes about the best balance between immigration control and community policing. Observers should note that sources citing legal limits tend to be grounded in state statutes and advocacy fact sheets, whereas counts of cooperating agencies derive from ICE partnership lists and media surveys, each reflecting different methodological choices and potential institutional incentives.