Can viewing child sexual abuse material (CSAM) over Tor be prosecuted in the U.S. if I didn't download or save files?

1. Law on the books: “access,” “receive,” and possession are criminalized

Federal statutes make producing, distributing, receiving, and possessing visual depictions of minors in sexually explicit conduct illegal; authorities and practice interpret “receive” and “access with intent to view” broadly, including realistic AI-generated material ^{[1] [2]}. Advocacy, DOJ guidance, and recent bills such as STOP CSAM and the REPORT Act show Congress is actively expanding reporting and enforcement mechanisms, increasing provider obligations and penalties ^{[5] [6]}.

2. “Mere viewing” is legally ambiguous — intent and technical possession matter

Some legal commentaries and defense sources note that mere transient online viewing without a downloaded file has been argued as not amounting to possession if no copy is saved; browser caches, temporary files, and user intent are often decisive in prosecutions ^[3]. At the same time, federal guidance and prosecutors treat “access with intent to view” as an actionable category, and the IC3 warning lists “access with intent to view” among prohibited acts ^{[2] [3]}. Available sources do not provide an across‑the‑board rule that viewing while using Tor is categorically safe from prosecution.

3. Practical evidence: how investigators can build a case even when you didn’t “save” files

Investigations rely on technical artifacts and provider reports: local device forensics can recover cached or temporary copies; providers and intermediaries increasingly must report CSAM and preserve materials under statutes such as REPORT Act provisions ^{[6] [3]}. In addition, law enforcement has in some high-profile cases unmasked Tor users through operational techniques or user errors (e.g., outdated software or timing analysis), showing that anonymity is not absolute ^{[4] [7]}. Research groups and law‑enforcement reports emphasize that dark‑web CSAM networks are monitored and occasionally disrupted ^{[8] [9]}.

4. Tor’s anonymity: strong but not impenetrable — and context matters

Tor routes traffic through relays to obscure origin, and the Tor Project emphasizes legitimate privacy uses, but reporting and academic work document large-scale CSAM activity via Tor and show law enforcement successes in deanonymization when operational vulnerabilities or user mistakes exist ^{[4] [10] [11]}. Public-interest groups argue Tor’s architecture can facilitate distribution of CSAM, while privacy advocates warn that weakening anonymity tools creates broader harms ^{[10] [12]}. Both perspectives are represented in the available reporting.

5. Evolving policy: new laws, reporting duties, and AI‑generated CSAM

Legislative initiatives and agency guidance treat AI‑generated CSAM seriously and often equate it with photographic CSAM for enforcement and reporting ^{[2] [13]}. Bills like the STOP CSAM measures and EU/UK policy moves show a trend toward broader obligations on platforms and stronger penalties; critics caution that some proposals could pressure platforms to over‑report or undermine encryption ^{[5] [14]}. The policy debate affects how strictly “access” and intermediary reporting are enforced.

6. What sources explicitly say (and what they don’t)

Sources state federal law criminalizes possession and “access with intent to view” and that AI‑generated CSAM can be prosecuted ^{[1] [2]}. They describe investigative techniques, provider reporting duties, and past arrests of darknet users ^{[4] [6] [8]}. Available sources do not provide a simple rule that viewing over Tor without download cannot be prosecuted; instead they show outcomes depend on technical traces, intent, provider reports, and investigative successes ^{[3] [4]}.

7. Practical takeaway and caution

If you are asking because of curiosity or research, note that U.S. law treats viewing, receiving, and possessing CSAM—including many AI‑generated depictions—as criminal when done knowingly, and investigators can often obtain technical evidence or unmask users under particular conditions ^{[1] [2] [4]}. For clear guidance tailored to a real situation, consult a criminal defense attorney; available reporting documents legal standards, enforcement trends, and the technical realities that prosecutors and defenders cite ^{[3] [6]}.