What maritime routes do cartels use through the Caribbean to reach the US mainland?
Executive summary
Cartels moving South American narcotics to the U.S. rely heavily on two maritime corridors: the Caribbean Sea route—often via Venezuela, Haiti, and the southern Caribbean islands—and the Eastern Pacific corridor; both are now prime focuses of large U.S. maritime and air deployments that the government says have disrupted shipments [1] [2]. Traffickers use a mix of platforms—high‑speed boats, private yachts, commercial cargo vessels, semisubmersibles/narco‑subs and, increasingly, unmanned craft and air routes—while shifting origin and transshipment points in response to interdiction pressure [3] [4].
1. How the Caribbean corridor works: islands, Venezuelan coasts and transshipment hubs
The Caribbean route channels drugs from Colombian production zones into Venezuela and then across the southern Caribbean through waters off eastern Delta Amacuro, Sucre and western Zulia and Falcón before moving toward the U.S. mainland and Europe; weak state control in places like Haiti and use of Quintana Roo and other Mexican Caribbean points as relay nodes are documented features of this pathway [5] [2]. Reporting and regional assessments say that Venezuela — and actors within its security forces alleged to be part of the “Cartel of the Suns” — have become central to getting bulk shipments into the Caribbean maritime network [5] [2].
2. Platforms and concealment: boats, cargo ships and narco‑subs
Traffickers use a portfolio of vessels: fast speedboats and private yachts for short hops; commercial cargo ships to hide bulk loads amid legitimate freight; self‑propelled semisubmersibles (“narco‑subs”) for stealth cross‑border moves; and increasingly remotely piloted or unmanned vessels after maritime pressure rose [3] [4]. Analysts emphasize that maritime trafficking remains attractive because of the volume that can be moved and the multiplicity of vessels and flags that complicate interdiction [3] [6].
3. U.S. response: naval build‑up, airstrikes and a new task force
Since mid‑2025 the U.S. has mounted a large naval and air deployment in the Caribbean framed as counternarcotics operations, created a new task force focused on maritime interdiction and begun striking suspected trafficking vessels—moves Washington says have “effectively shut down” portions of the Caribbean route and removed tonnage from transit [2] [7] [4]. Officials have acknowledged strikes were sometimes conducted without clear identification of every person aboard and that targeting relies on intelligence tying vessels to cartels [8] [9].
4. Traffickers’ adaptations: pivot to air, older land routes and remote tech
Sources indicate traffickers are pivoting away from some maritime approaches in response to U.S. pressure: air smuggling and revived overland corridors (through Central America and Mexico) are being used more, and cartels are experimenting with unmanned craft and narco‑subs to reduce human risk and detection [4] [7]. Military and policy analysts warn that focusing largely on sea interdiction can push flows into other domains rather than eliminate them [4].
5. Scale and targets: how much transited via the Caribbean before the surge
Estimates cited in reporting put the 2024 Caribbean shipments from Venezuela in the hundreds of tons (an estimate range of roughly 350–500 tons cited for cocaine moved through the route), figures the U.S. efforts say they aim to disrupt because the revenue sustains trafficking‑linked elements of state actors [2] [7]. That scale explains why maritime interdiction has been prioritized alongside political objectives directed at Venezuelan networks [2].
6. Disagreement, legal questions and regional pushback
The U.S. government emphasizes interdiction and has framed strikes as lawful counternarcotics action; outside observers and some local governments contest the approach, raising questions about evidence used to identify targets, civilian risk and international law—Congressional briefings and reporting note the administration sometimes lacks direct on‑scene identification of those struck [9] [8]. Regional governments at multilateral fora have warned against use of force and signaled diplomatic unease with large U.S. deployments [10].
7. Practical implications for U.S. shores and enforcement strategy
Because cartels quickly adapt, maritime pressure alone is unlikely to stop flows to the U.S.; interdiction can temporarily remove shipments and degrade maritime logistics, but experts and defense analysts expect displacement into air, land and unmanned methods unless interdiction is paired with international cooperation and broader pressure on production and financial networks [1] [4]. Available sources do not mention specific small coastal landing points inside the continental U.S. used by maritime smugglers.
Limitations: reporting in these sources mixes official U.S. claims, regional reporting and analysis; some figures (e.g., “effectively shut down”) are reported by U.S. or allied outlets citing government sources and sources with knowledge of operations and may be contested by other actors [2] [7]. Where sources do not address a point directly, I note that the claim is not found in current reporting (see above).