Which Caribbean islands are most frequently used as transshipment hubs by drug cartels?
Executive summary
Caribbean islands and territories most frequently identified as transshipment hubs include the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, the Leeward eastern islands like Aruba and Curaçao, and parts of the Lesser Antilles and British Overseas Territories — each cited in regional analysis and government reporting as recurring nodes in cocaine flows from South America to North America and Europe [1] [2] [3]. Analysts point to structural drivers — proximity to Venezuela and Colombia, weak interdiction capacity, porous coastlines, and presence of European territories — that make these specific islands attractive to traffickers [1] [4].
1. The usual suspects: Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico
Multiple U.S. and policy sources single out the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Puerto Rico as major staging and transshipment locations because of their geography, busy ports and limited enforcement capacity; congressional testimony and CSIS analysis both highlight these three as high‑use nodes for moving multi‑ton shipments onward to the United States [3] [1]. CSIS notes the Dominican Republic’s six container ports and large tourism/commerce flows create cover for mixed cargo and people movement; congressional records flag Puerto Rico as the “highest threat region” in the Caribbean transit zone [1] [3].
2. Eastern Caribbean, Dutch ABC islands, and Europe’s Caribbean outposts
The Dutch territories Aruba and Curaçao — and nearby eastern Caribbean islands — appear repeatedly in trafficking maps and in CSIS/UNODC discussions as direct conduits to Europe, due to their short maritime distances to Venezuela and established air/sea links to the Netherlands [2] [5]. CSIS and tracking projects underscore that European territories in the Caribbean present direct logistical routes for shipments bound for Europe, which incentivizes use of these islands by criminal organizations [1] [2].
3. Panama and major port transshipment hubs
While not an “island,” Panama’s hub status matters: LatinAmericanPost and other trade‑security coverage identify Panama’s transshipment nodes and container corridors as priority targets for traffickers exploiting global trade flows, turning large ports and reefer corridors into high‑risk lanes for concealment [6]. The reporting shows cartels increasingly exploit containerized shipping and insider manipulation at major transshipment points — a method applied across Caribbean ports as well [6].
4. Why these places are used: geography, governance, and corruption
Analysts list the same combination of factors making islands attractive: proximity to cocaine source zones (Venezuela/Colombia), numerous small islands and coastlines enabling covert transfers, weak maritime and customs capacity, and corruption or insider access at ports and airstrips [1] [6]. The Treasury and OFAC actions in 2025 against networks operating out of Guyana and across Trinidad and Tobago waters underline how geography plus local vulnerabilities create repeat opportunities for transshipment [7].
5. Cartel adaptation and shifting routes — the limits of interdiction
Recent policy reporting and opinion pieces warn that strikes and interdictions have limited, short‑term effects because traffickers adapt: shifting from maritime to air routes, using narco‑subs and remote methods, or rerouting through less scrutinized islands. Commentators argue that destroying boats can remove some capacity but does not stop networks that use multiple, redundant transit points across the Caribbean [8] [9] [10].
6. Evidence gaps and caveats in public reporting
Available sources provide strong regional patterns but do not offer a definitive, ranked list of “most frequently used” islands with precise counts per island; maps and policy reports identify hotspots and recurring countries (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Aruba/Curaçao, certain British territories) but do not supply exhaustive, island‑by‑island frequency tallies in the public record cited here [5] [1] [2]. Analysts use seizures, interdiction reports and country risk assessments to infer routes rather than publish comprehensive raw transaction datasets [5] [4].
7. Competing narratives and hidden incentives
U.S. policy pieces emphasize military and interdiction responses; independent analysts stress interdiction alone can be counterproductive if it erodes international cooperation or fails to address corruption and port security [11] [9]. Some government sources highlight European territories’ vulnerability to transatlantic flows [1] while trade‑security outlets point to Panama and containerized commerce as the systemic vulnerability traffickers exploit [6].
Conclusion — what this means for policy and reporting
Public reporting and expert analysis consistently point to a clustered set of Caribbean countries and territories — Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Aruba/Curaçao and other eastern islands, plus major transshipment hubs like Panama’s ports — as the recurring nodes used by traffickers because of geography, port complexity and enforcement gaps; however, available sources do not provide a single, definitive frequency ranking per island and emphasize that traffickers continuously shift routes in response to enforcement [1] [2] [6].