Which Caribbean islands serve as primary transshipment hubs for cocaine bound for the United States?

1. Hispaniola: the twin hubs of the Dominican Republic and Haiti

The island of Hispaniola is repeatedly cited as a key stepping-stone because its proximity to South America and to Puerto Rico/Florida makes it ideal for intra-island boat transfers, light aircraft hops, and maritime off-loading; both the Dominican Republic and Haiti are described as staging and transshipment points for cocaine destined for the United States and Europe ^{[1] [2]}. Haiti’s weak institutions, porous coastlines, and history of contraband trade are explicitly named as factors that traffickers exploit, and reports note cargo freighters off-loading to smaller vessels and overland transfers between Haiti and the Dominican Republic en route to Puerto Rico, CONUS, Europe, or Canada ^[2].

2. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands: U.S. territories as transit chokepoints

U.S. territories in the northeastern Caribbean—Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands—function as both destinations and transshipment zones because they form part of the “Caribbean Border” and are geographically well-placed for movement to Florida and the U.S. East and Gulf Coasts; U.S. strategy documents identify these islands as routinely targeted by transnational criminal organizations ^[3]. The official framing carries an implicit agenda of justifying U.S. interdiction and cooperation initiatives in the region, as the White House strategy foregrounds homeland security concerns while calling for partner capacity-building ^[3].

3. Southern and ABC islands: Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire as Europe gateways

The southern Dutch Caribbean—Aruba and Curaçao—and the Caribbean Netherlands are important because traffickers use them to ship cocaine directly to the Netherlands or to move consignments eastward through the Caribbean; analyses of transatlantic flows note direct sea and air routes from Aruba and Curaçao to the Netherlands and the use of nearby islands as onward transshipment points ^[4]. That pattern highlights the dual-purpose role of some islands as conduits to both Europe and the United States, complicating simple northbound narratives ^[4].

4. British territories and smaller eastern islands: low-capacity, high-risk nodes

British Overseas Territories and small eastern Caribbean islands—including the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, and Anguilla—are documented as being used for transshipment, with seizures and policing irregularities underscoring how limited interdiction capacity and corruption create opportunities for traffickers ^[5]. The CSIS analysis emphasizes that small seizure numbers can reflect enforcement gaps rather than low trafficking levels, an important caveat when interpreting official statistics ^[5].

5. Guyana and Suriname: continental staging points with maritime links north

Guyana and Suriname on South America’s northeast coast are cited as northbound transshipment points exploited by traffickers using ports, clandestine airstrips, and narco-submersibles to move cocaine into the Caribbean and onward to the United States and Europe; recent U.S. sanctions and treasury statements name Guyana and Suriname explicitly in network interdiction actions ^[7]. Those findings point to a continental-to-island bridge that traffickers use to access the Caribbean chain of hubs ^[7].

6. Cuba, Jamaica and historical context: occasional but consequential roles

Congressional reporting and international intelligence have at times identified Cuba and Jamaica as transit or facilitation locations—Cuban airspace was alleged in historical indictments to have been offered to traffickers, and Jamaica is repeatedly noted as a transit point for cocaine bound northward—though the footprint and frequency vary across sources and time frames ^{[8] [6]}. UN and other analyses complicate singular blame on any one country by noting the plurality of routes ^{[9] [10]}.

7. Limits of reporting and why “multiple hubs” matters

Open-source reporting and government documents consistently emphasize a distributed network—“island hopping,” maritime transfers, narco-subs and airstrips—so the correct framing is multiple, overlapping transshipment hubs rather than a single island as the primary conduit; this distribution reflects traffickers exploiting geography, weak port controls, and governance gaps across the Caribbean ^{[10] [3] [4]}. Where sources do not provide current seizure totals or attribute precise shares to specific islands, this analysis does not assert finer-grained rankings beyond the documented hubs and pathways ^{[10] [5]}.